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Cost and Capital Punishment: A New
Consideration Transforms an Old Debate
Carol S. Steiker and JordanM. Steikert

Justice is priceless. We need to keep this law on the books.1
Father of murder victim testifying in debate over
abolition in Kansas.
Every dollar that goes to our ineffective capital
punishment system is a dollar taken away from other
2
needs.
Former Director of the Kentucky Administrative Office
of the Courts.
There's something unsavory about finances driving
abolition of the death penalty, but the high costs of, and
lack of benefits provided by executions, are real. So if this
halts the needless extermination of fellow human beings,
3
so be it.
Op-Ed by Two Board Members of the Illinois Coalition
to Abolish the Death Penalty.

t Howard J. and Katherine W. Aibel Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, and
Judge Robert M. Parker Endowed Chair in Law, University of Texas School of Law. We
thank Jennifer Laurin, Sandy Levinson, and the participants in the University of
Chicago Legal Forum symposium in October 2009 for their helpful comments and Jacob
Eisler of Harvard Law School and Heather Mahurin of the University of Texas School of
Law for excellent research assistance.
1 Barbara Hollingsworth, Pleas Made for Executions, Topeka Capital J (Jan 21,
2010),
online
at
httpV/cjonline.con/news/legislature/2010-01-21/pleas-made-for_
executions (visited Aug 19, 2010).
2 R. G. Dunlop, Kentucky's Troubled Death-PenaltySystem Lets Cases Languish for
Decades, Courier-J NaN (Nov 7, 2009).
3 Tom Broderick and Patrick McAnany, Abolish the Death Penalty in 2010, Wed J at
Oak Park & River Forest (Jan 5, 2010) (on file with U Chi Legal F).
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INTRODUCTION

Moral and political debates about the death penalty have a
certain timeless quality. Many of the same arguments and even
examples (God's sparing of Cain!) reappear from generation to
generation. It can truly seem that there is nothing new under the
sun. Nonetheless, though its novelty has largely escaped notice,
the argument for abolition based on the expense of administering
a system of capital punishment is a new phenomenon-one that
is extraordinarily powerful in current public policy debates,
while being virtually nonexistent in the debates of prior generations. In what follows, we describe the present ubiquity of the
cost argument and contrast its current prevalence with its former absence. We trace the changes that allowed the new argument to arise, and we note the rhetorical and strategic functions
served by the new argument that have ensured its prominence in
today's debates. In doing so, we hope to demonstrate not only
that arguments as timeworn as those about capital punishment
do in fact change, but also that the changes in discourse about
capital punishment offer a revealing window onto both current
death penalty practices on the ground and their broader social
meaning.
I. YESTERDAY AND TODAY: THE UBIQUITY AND NOVELTY OF
COST ARGUMENTS IN CURRENT DEATH PENALTY DEBATES

A.

The Ubiquity of Cost Arguments Today

The high cost of administering the death penalty has become
a prominent-perhaps the most prominent-issue in contemporary discussions about whether the penalty should be limited or
abolished. Dozens of articles and editorials have highlighted the
economic pitfalls of capital punishment in each of the past several years, with references to costs rising sharply since the economic downturn of late 2008. The cost question emerged as a central
consideration in the many states that have considered restricting
the death penalty (including the three that recently abandoned
capital punishment-New Jersey in 2007, New Mexico in 2009,
and New York in 2004). 4 The Death Penalty Information Center,
which serves as the clearinghouse for news and developments
concerning the American death penalty (from an abolitionist per4 See Death Penalty Information Center, Recent Legislative Activity, online at
http//www.deathpenaltyinfo.orgrecent-legislative-activity (visited Aug 16, 2010).
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spective), captured the significant role the cost issue has played
over the past year in the heading of its recently released yearend report: "Fewest Death Sentences Since Death Penalty Reinstated in 1976; As Costs Rose in a Time of Economic Crisis,
Eleven States Considered Abolishing Death Penalty."5 This report followed the release of the Center's earlier coverage of the
cost issue: "Smart on Crime: Reconsidering the Death Penalty in
a Time of Economic Crisis."6 The prominence of the cost argument is also reflected on the website of the National Coalition to
Abolish the Death Penalty, the leading abolitionist organization
in the US, which lists as its first (of ten) public policy arguments
against the death penalty: "Executions are carried out at stag7
gering cost to taxpayers."
Concerns about cost emerge in varying ways depending on
the jurisdiction. In California, where prosecutors have secured a
significant number of death sentences over the years but a confluence of forces has prevented their culmination in executions,
the death-row population has swelled to almost seven hundred
inmates.8 Critics thus point to the extraordinary expense of
housing the state's death-row population (compared to the costs
of ordinary incarceration), with one recent article indicating that
death-row incarceration costs the state an additional $90,000 per
inmate, per year (or $60 million a year overall).9 Critics also
highlight the cost of California's death penalty on a perexecution basis, with a recent editorial in the New York Times
suggesting that California's thirteen executions over the past
thirty-five years have cost about a quarter of a billion dollars
each (dividing the capital expenditures on all cases by the thirteen executions carried out). 10 Recent editorials emphasize that
ending the death penalty could help California reduce its extraordinary budget deficits: "California Can't Afford the Death
5 Death Penalty Information Center, The Death Penalty in 2009: Year End Report
(Death Penalty Information Center 2009), online at http/www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
documents/2009YearEndReport.pdf (visited Aug 19, 2010).
6 Richard C. Dieter, Smart on Crime: Reconsidering the Death Penalty in a Time of
Economic Crisis (Death Penalty Information Center 2009), online at http//www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/CostsRptFinal.pdf (visited Aug 19, 2010).
7 Death Penalty Overview: Ten Reasons Why Capital Punishment Is Flawed Public
Policy (National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty 2010), online at httpV/www.
ncadp.org/index.cfm?content=5 (visited Aug 19, 2010).
8 Death Penalty Information Center, State by State Database,online at http;//www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-bystate (visited Aug 19, 2010).
9 Final Report, California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice (2008),
online at http/www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf (visited Aug 19, 2010).
10 Editorial, High Cost of Death Row, NY Times A22 (Sept 28, 2009).
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Penalty,"1" and, more succinctly, "Save $1 Billion in Five YearsEnd the Death Penalty in California." 12 Other states with few
executions have likewise faced criticism about the costs of capital
litigation given such a limited return in terms of executions. In
Kentucky, a recent article indicated that over a third of the current death-row inmates in the state had been on death row over
two decades, and the state had carried out only three executions
over the past forty years; 13 the article began by observing that
"Kentucky is spending millions of dollars each year on a capital
punishment system so ineffective that more death-row inmates
are dying of natural causes than are being executed." 14 Similar
concerns were voiced in Maryland, which came close to abolishing the death penalty last year, given a 2008 study indicating
that the state spent at least an additional $37.2 million for each
of the state's five executions in the modern era 15 (again calculating total costs for all capital cases and dividing this by the number of actual executions). 16
In other states active in both death sentencing and executions, news reports have focused on particularly expensive capital trials and whether state and local governments can bear such
costs. Perhaps the most notable case along these lines involved
the capital prosecution of Brian Nichols, who was tried in
Georgia for killing a judge, a court stenographer, a sheriff's deputy, and a federal agent after escaping from an Atlanta courtroom (where he faced a rape prosecution).1 7 Nichols's trial reportedly cost more than $3 million, and the jury ultimately could
not agree on punishment, so Nichols was spared the death penalty.18 The cost of Nichols's trial received particular attention be-

11 John Van de Kamp, CaliforniaCan'tAfford the DeathPenalty, Press Democrat B7
(June 14, 2009).
12 Natasha Minsker, Save $1 Billion in Five Years-End the Death Penalty in
California,7 CityWatch 44 (June 22, 2009).
13 Dunlop, Kentucky's Troubled Death-Penalty System Lets Cases Languish for
Decades, Courier-J at NaN (cited in note 2).
14 Id.

15 The "modern era" of capital punishment began in the mid-1970s with the Supreme
Court's decisions upholding revised state capital statutes and the resumption of executions following a ten-year moratorium on executions.
16 John Roman et al, The Cost of the Death Penalty in Maryland 3 (Urban Institute
Justice Policy Center 2008), online at http/www.urban.orgUploadedPDF/411625md deathpenalty.pdf (visited Aug 19, 2010) (estimating "the total cost of the death penalty to Maryland taxpayers for cases that began between 1978 and 1999 to be at least
$186 million").
17 Steve Visser and Rhonda Cook, Nichols' Defense Costs $3.2 Million; State, Fulton
County Had to Foot the Bill, Atlanta J-Const B1 (July 22, 2009).
18 Id.
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cause the outlays to Nichols's defense team drained funds from
Georgia's already woefully underfunded criminal justice system
(at a time when ongoing litigation challenging the adequacy of
funding for indigent defense had caused substantial delays in
criminal trials). 19 In Texas, the recent capital prosecution of Levi
King in Gray County received considerable attention because
King was already under a life sentence in Missouri when the
Texas prosecutor decided to seek death; the rural county spent
almost 10% of its budget ($750,000) for the defense of King, who,
like Nichols, ultimately received a life sentence. 20 News reports
indicated that the King prosecution caused county commission21
ers to withhold employee raises and increase local tax rates.
The cost argument may well have been decisive in the legislative abolition of the death penalty in New Jersey (2007) and
New Mexico (2009). In New Jersey, public opinion tilted toward
retention at the time the legislature acted. 22 The state commission charged with studying capital punishment concluded that
the death penalty was no longer consistent with evolving standards of decency. 23 But, as newspaper coverage of the legislative
decision reveals, "equally persuasive to lawmakers was not saving lives but saving money" 24 in light of the increased costs of
death-row incarceration. Like California, Kentucky, and
Maryland, New Jersey had not been active in carrying out executions; indeed, New Jersey had not executed any inmate in the
modern era. Given the prospect of indefinitely housing inmates
on death row, the state chose to abolish the death penalty in part
to avoid the additional $1.3 million cost of lifetime incarceration
25
on death row per inmate.
In New Mexico, the only state to abolish the death penalty
since the economic downturn of late 2008, the cost issue was one
of several that tipped the state toward abolition. Abolition efforts
had been underway for over a decade, and the demographics and
politics of New Mexico were unique; religious opposition to the
death penalty was strong (Governor Bill Richardson, who signed
19 Bill Rankin, Case Could Decide Whether Georgia Can Afford the Death Penalty,
Atlanta J-Const Al (Nov 10, 2009).
20 David Pittman, Murder Trial Costs Gray County a Lot, Lubbock Avalanche-J Al
(Oct 20, 2009).
21 Id.

22 Keith B. Richburg, N.J. Approves Abolition of Death Penalty; Corzine to Sign,
Wash Post A3 (Dec 13, 2007).
23 Id.
24

Id.

25 Id.
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the repeal bill, was himself a practicing Catholic), and there was
a peculiar history of the death penalty in the state that included
the US government's execution of several native New Mexicans
who resisted US occupation in 1847.26 At least one account,
though, points to the cost issue as significant (despite the relative paucity of death-sentenced inmates-a total of two-in the
state):
[T]he New Mexico abolition campaign made use of an argument never used in death penalty debate in the 1960s
and 1970s but which probably helped turn the tide in
2009-the cost of administering the death penalty, from
trial to appeal to post conviction relief to federal habeas
corpus to isolation of men on death row to costs of execution was simply an expenditure of too much public money
when the state was starving for dollars for good pro27
grams.
In the months leading up to his decision to sign the repeal,
Governor Richardson himself also cited the economic cost of capital punishment as a factor relevant to his decision (cost is "a valid reason in this era of austerity and tight budgets"), 28 though he
made no mention of cost in the statement he read on the day he
29
actually signed the repeal.
In New York, the state's capital statute (enacted in 1995)
was invalidated judicially in 2004 on the ground that its deadlock provision (in the event jurors could not decide between
death and life without possibility of parole) inappropriately coerced jurors to reach a decision by allowing a sentence of less
30
than life imprisonment to be imposed in the event of deadlock.
The provision was eminently fixable, but the judicial decision
prompted wide-ranging debate about whether to save the New
York death penalty. The State Assembly conducted extensive
public hearings, and the state ultimately chose not to correct the
statutory defect, essentially leaving the state without the death
26 Steve Terrell, Death Penalty Used Sparingly Throughout New Mexico's History,
Santa Fe New Mexican Al (Mar 15, 2009).
27 Galen Barnett, Op-Ed, A Golden Opportunity to End the Death Penalty, Oregonian
(Apr 6, 2009), online at http;//www.oregonlive.conVopinio~nfmdex.ssf/2009/04/agoldenopportunityto endth.html (visited Aug 19, 2010).
28 Ian Urbina, In Push to End Death Penalty, Some States Cite Cost-Cutting, NY
Times Al (Feb 25, 2009).
29 Steve Terrell, Death Penalty Repeal Is Law, Santa Fe New Mexican Al (Mar 19,
2009).
30 People v LaValle, 817 NE2d 341, 359 (NY 2004).
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penalty. Among the prominent considerations in its decision not
to act was the high cost of administering a capital system. The
Assembly's report on the public hearings cited testimony from a
district attorney that the state spent as much as $200 million on
capital prosecutions in the decade or so that the statute had been
in effect and that the reinstatement of the death penalty might
cost the state another $500 million over twenty years, while likely yielding only two or three executions during that period. 31
In other states that have actively considered repeal, financial considerations have been at the forefront of the discussion.
In Colorado, the effort to abolish the death penalty was explicitly
tied to freeing up funds to solve "cold case[s]." 32 Despite its small
death row (three), Colorado apparently spends approximately
four million dollars a year on capital costs. 3 3 The proposed legislation to abolish the death penalty mandated that the money
saved by the measure would be dedicated to funding eight state
34
investigators to reopen more than 1,400 cold-case homicides.
The measure came within one vote of passing, but died in the
Colorado Senate, where the abolition portion was stripped from
the bill. 35 The striking aspect of the Colorado experience was
that the focal point of the abolitionist effort was to drive home
the opportunity costs of retention and to highlight in concrete
terms the alternative goods that death penalty dollars could purchase.
Cost considerations were likewise prominent in Montana's
consideration of abolition. The Montana Senate approved an abolition bill in 2009, but the bill was defeated in the House
Judiciary Committee. 36 As in Colorado, the cost argument
seemed to carry significant weight despite the relatively rare use
of capital punishment in the state; Montana has executed three
inmates over the past forty years and has only two inmates cur-

31 The Death Penalty in New York: To Examine the Future of Capital Punishment in
New York State, Hearing before Assembly Standing Committee on Codes, Assembly
Standing Committee on Judiciary, and Assembly Standing Committee on Correction
(2005) (statement of Robert Morgenthau).
32 Morgan Carroll and Paul Weissmann, Editorial, Revisit Death Penalty Bill, Denver
Post Bl (May 21, 2009).
33 Id.

34 Tim Hoover and John Ingold, Ritter Keeps Death-Penalty View to Himself, Denver
Post B4 (May 8, 2009).
35 Carroll and Weissmann, Revisit Death Penalty Bill, Denver Post at B1 (cited in
note 32).
36 John S. Adams, Legislature Leaves Boatload of New Laws to Digest, Great Falls
Trib Al (May 3, 2009).
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rently on death row. 37 New Hampshire, which likewise considered legislative abolition in 2009, has established a commission
to study the death penalty and issue a report by the end of this
year. 38 Although New Hampshire has only one inmate on death
row and has carried out no executions since 1939, one of the six
questions to be addressed by the commission is whether "there is
a significant difference in the cost of prosecution and incarceration between capital punishment and life without possibility of
parole for the convicted capital murderer." 39 This question comes
on the heels of a 2008 master plan by the New Hampshire
Department of Corrections indicating that it would cost over $3
million to build and staff a lethal injection death chamber to ad40
minister executions in the state.
B.

The Relative Absence of Cost Arguments Before the Modern
Era

The ubiquity of arguments about the high cost of administering capital punishment relative to the cost of imprisonment in
current death penalty debates tends to obscure just how novel
such arguments are in the long history of controversy over capital punishment in the United States. Although the death penalty
was a well-established practice in colonial America, influential
thinkers voiced doubts about its appropriateness as early as the
Founding era, and reforms and alternatives followed soon thereafter-reforms that eventually produced the extensive prison
system that now dominates penal policy in the United States.
But neither the widespread acceptance of capital punishment nor
the criticisms of it voiced by reformers were based on its relative
cost vis-h-vis other punishments. Indeed, for much of American
history, the cost argument almost surely would have run the
other way (in favor of the death penalty, rather than against
it)-had anyone cared to make it. But references to the relative
cost of capital punishment have been exceedingly rare in death
penalty debates until quite recently, and even when made, the
argument never served as a major focal point of debate. This lack
of interest in the relative cost of capital punishment remained
37 Death Penalty Information Center, State by State Database(cited in note 8).
38 Kevin Landrigan, New Hampshire Commission Examines Costs to Carry Out
CapitalPunishment, Telegraph (Nashua, NH) (Dec 5, 2009).
39 Kevin Landrigan, Panel Puts Death Penalty on Trial, Telegraph (Nashua, NH)
(Oct 22, 2009).
40 Id.
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true in the past even during times of economic crisis and even
when the relative cost advantages or disadvantages of executions
seemed obvious.
Consider the colonial era. Incarceration was not yet a viable
penal option, as the prisons that eventually came to dominate
the American penal system had not yet been imagined or built.
Jails were used mainly for debtors and pre-trial incarceration.
Rather, the most common punishments were corporal (whippings, brandings), shaming (the stock and the public cage), fines,
41
banishment, and capital punishment (usually by hanging). Of
these punishments, capital punishment was likely the most expensive. It was common to allow a significant period-at least a
week and often several weeks or even months-to elapse between the sentencing of a condemned person and the carrying
out of the execution, in order to facilitate the criminal's repentance and to allow for word to spread so that interested spectators
could make plans to attend the edifying spectacle. 42 The costs of
such delays were substantial-the simple housing and feeding of
the condemned was a "significant expense," 43 and the costs of
pursuing and recapturing condemned inmates who escaped from
44
the often insecure jails of the time were also considerable.
Despite these expenses, the practice of delaying executions in
order to minister to the condemned and to allow for widespread
public attendance continued without demur. The unquestioned
willingness to incur such costs reflected "a consensus on the inportance of the criminal's salvation" 45 as well as an assumption
that public attendance at executions served valuable functions.
These functions included the general deterrence offered by the
spectacle of the condemned's suffering (hanging was an inexact
science and could often be quite gruesome), the community cohesiveness promoted by the ritual of public condemnation of
wrongdoing, and the moral instruction offered both by the public
repentance of many on the gallows and by the sermons that were
preached as part of the execution ritual. As Cotton Mather
opined, an execution could be "a very miserable, but ... also a
41 David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States, 1789-1865, in Norval
Morris and David J. Rothman, eds, The Oxford History of the Prison: The Practice of
Punishment in Western Society 112 (Oxford 1995).
42 See Stuart Banner, The Death Penalty: An American History 17 (Harvard 2002).
43 Id at 17.
44 See id at 18 ("The expenses of twice recapturing John Brown [a condemned burglar
who twice escaped from the Litchfield jail], for example, formed a major part of the bill
submitted to the Connecticut Assembly by William Stanton, Litchfield's jailer.").
45 Id at 17.
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very profitable Spectacle." 4 6 In short, despite its higher financial
costs, capital punishment was considered unquestionably "worth
it": "Hardly anyone [during the colonial era] suggested that it be
47
used more sparingly, much less that it be abandoned."
The first serious criticism of the well-entrenched practice of
capital punishment arose in the second half of the eighteenth
century. A number of important Founding era thinkers,
including Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and James
Madison, made arguments urging the restriction or even the abolition of capital punishment in the new republic. These and other
early American critics of capital punishment drew upon the
hugely influential work of Italian philosopher Cesare Beccaria,
who published his Essay on Crimes and Punishments in 1764,
calling for the wholesale abolition of capital punishment. 48 Beccaria's argument began with political theory: he drew on the social contract theory of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau to argue for
a limit on the authority of the state over human life. In Beccaria's view, governments had no authority to impose death as
punishment because individuals lacked the right themselves to
commit suicide and thus could not delegate such a right to the
state. To the New World architects of the first constitutional democracy, who were strongly influenced by the body of thought
upon which Beccaria drew, this argument was powerful.
The bulk of Beccaria's argument against the death penalty,
however, was grounded more in utilitarian cost-benefit calculus
than in political theory: "[T]he punishment of death is not authori[zed] by any right ....

But if I can further demonstrate that it

is neither necessary nor useful, I shall have gained the cause of
humanity."49 Although Beccaria's case against the death penalty
was primarily utilitarian, it did not address at all the direct costs
of imposing the death penalty relative to the costs of imposing a
life sentence of forced labor (which Beccaria advocated as an alternative). Rather, Beccaria addressed the more general utility of
capital punishment by systematically challenging the social
functions that the public execution of wrongdoers was thought to
serve. As for deterrence, Beccaria argued that the threat of "per-

46 Banner, The Death Penalty at 33 (cited in note 42) (quoting Cotton Mather's diary).
47 Id at 23.
48 See Cesare Beccaria, Of Crimes and Punishments (1764), online at http/www.
constitution.org/cb/crim-pun28.htm (visited Aug 21, 2010). For Beccaria's influence on
New World thinkers, see Banner, The Death Penalty at 88-92 (cited in note 42).
49 See Beccaria, Of Crimes and Punishments (cited in note 48).
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petual slavery" 50 was a sufficient deterrent for even the most serious crimes, because potential criminals would fear it more than
the fleeting pain of execution. Indeed, the emphasis placed on
promoting the condemned's salvation worked to undermine the
deterrent effect of the death penalty, in Beccaria's view, because
the promise of "eternal happiness upon the easy terms of repentance" would necessarily "lessen the horror" of the threat of execution. Beccaria further argued that forced labor, though a better
deterrent than the death penalty, was actually less "cruel," because it was a less concentrated punishment and because longterm prisoners develop ways of coping with their conditions.
Moreover, Beccaria challenged the idea that executions were appropriate expressions of the community's condemnation of serious wrongdoing or morally edifying for spectators. He declared it
"absurd" for the state to publicly commit murder in order to condemn it and argued that executions afforded an "example of barbarity" that its witnesses would be more prone to emulate than
to avoid. 51
Beccaria's essay shaped the general structure of the debate
about the death penalty on both sides of the Atlantic in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Despite the strongly
utilitarian flavor of many of the arguments questioning the practice of capital punishment, however, the issue of cost in our
modern sense-that is, the relative financial costs to the state of
imposing death versus some alternative punishment-was
notably absent from the cost-benefit calculus. The closest that
the most prominent reformers came to the cost issue was to note
that executing wrongdoers prevented them from ever contributing to society in the future-either through their forced labor
to compensate victims or the state, or through their reform and
rehabilitation.
Jeremy Bentham, the father of modern utilitarianism, developed this critique of the death penalty in his essay The Rationale of Punishment, published in 1775, arguing that imprisonment was a superior punishment to execution because the
death penalty was "not convertible to profit" and lacked "frugality"-meaning that convicts cannot provide "compensation" to
victims or the state and cannot be "reformed, and rendered of
some use to society."52 On the other side of the Atlantic, Thomas
50 Id.
51 Id.

52 Hugo Adam Bedau, Death Is Different: Studies in the Morality,Law, and Politics of
Capital Punishment 76-78 (Northeastern 1987).
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Jefferson made a similar argument in favor of abandoning capital punishment for lesser felonies in the newly independent state
of Virginia in 1778: criminals who were not executed might "be
rendered useful in various labors for the public." 53 Despite this
hope among reformers that those spared execution might "be
rendered useful" in some way, the argument remained entirely
theoretical; no one on either side of the death penalty debate
made any attempt to determine whether this "usefulness" would
in fact generally outweigh the costs of imprisoning those spared
execution. In any event, this argument clearly took a back seat to
the more prevalent arguments about optimal deterrence and appropriate moral education that lay at the heart of the new utilitarian critique of the death penalty.
One might think that the question of the relative cost of executions and imprisonment would have been launched from the
realm of the theoretical to a more prominent place in death penalty debates during the great prison-building period of the early
to mid-nineteenth century. In the 1820s, Pennsylvania and New
York created rival models of the new "penitentiary" system that
spread rapidly among states in the Northeast and Midwest in
the decades that followed. The penitentiary was the brainchild of
reformers who urged that crime was caused not primarily by individual sin, but rather by pernicious social influences. Under
this view, wrongdoers could be reformed if they were removed
from such influences and subjected to a regimen of strict discipline in a "corruption-free environment." 54 The Pennsylvania
prison model mandated that the prisoners be completely isolated
in individual cells at all times, day and night, including
mealtimes. The New York "congregate" model, inaugurated at
Auburn State Prison, had prisoners engage in communal work
and eat together during the day (though the rules also commanded silence) and then retire to individual cells at night. Both
models, however, required the appropriation of public funds for
the construction of massive new structures in order to implement
their shared vision of reform through removal to a completely
controlled environment. Prisons of this new style proliferated in
the decades following their introduction in Pennsylvania and
New York in the early 1820s: state penitentiaries were constructed in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Maryland in the
53 Banner, The Death Penalty at 95 (cited in note 42).
54 David J. Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorderin the
New Republic 71 (Little Brown 1971).
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late 1820s; in New Jersey, Ohio, and Michigan in the 1830s; and
in Indiana, Wisconsin, and Minnesota in the 1840s. 55 One might
think that the large outlays of public funds that were required to
build these new prisons might make an appearance in the death
penalty debates of the period, which were quite lively, 56 but one
searches for such references in vain.
The absence of arguments in contemporaneous death penalty debates about the high cost of incarceration in the new penitentiaries likely stems from two quite different sources-the ideological confidence of reformers that the overall benefits of the
new penological regime would outweigh its costs and the more
immediately pragmatic assessment that the new prisons could
offset their costs specifically through the provision of cheap prison labor. As for ideology, the new prisons were the product partly
of religious influence (the Quakers played a large role in the new
prison movement, especially in Pennsylvania); the reformers believed that the new "penitentiaries" were more likely than the
gallows to produce genuine repentance and thus salvation, upon
which no price could be set. 57 Moreover, the reformers were convinced that the new prisons would also better deter crime and
prevent recidivism through reformation-a promise which, if
realized, would clearly outweigh the costs of innovation. 58 The
political success of the prison reformers suggests that these
views were widely shared, and thus, there was remarkably little
grumbling about the costs of prison construction. 59 Political willingness to appropriate funds for prisons also was promoted by
the more immediately pragmatic expectation that the new prisons would be a source of ample, cheap labor-a highly valuable
commodity in an era of increasing industrialization. 60 As a con55 Id at 79-81.
56 See Banner, The Death Penalty at 113-37 (cited in note 42) (describing in detail
the debates and legislative reform efforts with regard to the death penalty in northern
states from the 1830s through the 1850s).
57 Id at 102 ("The very word reformers used to describe the prison-a 'penitentiary'emphasized the spiritual transformation they hoped would take place during the period
of incarceration.").
58 See Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History 80
(BasicBooks 1993) (describing the confidence of "almost all prison reformers" that the
new penitentiary "was stern but effective medicine" for shaping the characters and promoting the rehabilitation of prisoners).
59 Rothman, Perfecting the Prison at 121 (cited in note 41) ("Given the promise of
reform, legislatures readily appropriated the funds for construction, and when more cells
were needed, they made the funds available.").
60 See, for example, Michael Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in
the Industrial Revolution 1750-1850 109-11 (Pantheon 1978) (describing how Jeremy
Bentham touted the Panopticon as a source of free labor).
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sequence, the issue of the costs of the new prisons arose in political debate not to urge greater reliance on (presumably cheaper)
capital punishment, but rather to promote the New York's "congregate" prison model over Pennsylvania's isolation model, on
the ground that the former was more conducive to profitable
61
prison labor than the latter.
One sees much the same phenomenon during the
Progressive era and its immediate aftermath-the most active
period of death penalty repeal and reinstatement in American
history. Ten states abolished capital punishment between 1897
and 1917, and eight of them reinstated the death penalty by the
end of the 1930s-some within only a few years of the original
abolition. 62 Despite the fact that repeal was associated with economic boom and reinstatement with economic recession and depression during this period, 63 the lively and extensive debates of
the era barely mention the relative cost of capital punishment
vis-h-vis imprisonment. Indeed, in a voluminous and widely
available "debaters' handbook" on capital punishment, which
went through five editions between 1909 and 1939,64 there are
hardly any direct references to the cost argument in the dozens
of collected excerpts from newspapers, magazines, and scholarly
journals. A single author listed as the sixth of eight arguments in
favor of the death penalty that "[i]t saves the community all cost
of keeping criminals many years." 65 However, he quickly dispatched the argument, despite acknowledging its "rude truth,"
on the ground that "men under a life sentence could be placed in
a position to earn the cost of their keep and a good margin over
in addition."66 Despite strong opposition from businesses and
67
labor unions opposed to competition from the prison industry,
61 Rothman, Perfecting the Prison at 119 (cited in note 41) (noting that proponents of
the New York model "maintained, altogether accurately, that Auburn was considerably
less expensive to build and maintain and that prison labor in congregate workshops
would bring greater returns to the state").
62 John F. Galliher, Gregory Ray, and Brent Cook, Abolition and Reinstatement of
CapitalPunishment During the ProgressiveEra and Early 20th Century, 83 J Crim L &
Criminol 538, 543-73 (1992) (providing state-by-state accounts of these abolitions and
reinstatements).
63 Id.

64 See Banner, The Death Penalty at 220 (cited in note 42).
65 G. Rayleigh Vicars, Ought CapitalPunishment to be Abolished?, 143 Westminster
Rev 561-66 (1895). online at http//www.archive.org/streai/capitalpunishartic00fann
rich/capitalpunisharticOOfannrich-djvu.txt (visited Aug 19, 2010).
66 Id.
67 See Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History at 158 (cited in note
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prison labor was widely enough used and profitable enough to
undercut the potentially powerful cost argument against longterm imprisonment. In short, until well into the twentieth century, one gets the sense that both capital punishment and imprisonment were relatively cheap compared to their costs today, so
that no one spent much time trying to figure out which was
cheaper or arguing for or against the death penalty on such
grounds.
By the middle of the 20th century, however, a consensus
seemed to have emerged that long-term incarceration was in fact
more expensive than capital punishment, despite any offset from
prison labor. Many of the most active death penalty jurisdictions
in the pre-Warren Court era afforded capital defendants minimal
procedural protections, 68 often completing capital trials-from
jury selection to death sentence-in a single day. Given the low
cost of legal proceedings even in the most serious cases, it stood
to reason that capital punishment must save the state money by
eliminating the costs associated with long-term incarceration.
Writing near the end of the 1950s, a scholar analyzing the deterrent effect of capital punishment identified the cost argument as
a similar "Non-Dogma" or empirically testable proposition and
tellingly identified the testable hypothesis as the "economic advantages derived from execution as contrasted to imprisonment."69 That capital punishment produced such economic advantages was "a very pervasive belief "70 in the second half of the
twentieth century-so much so that the public continued to assume that capital punishment was the cheaper option even as
the costs of administering the death penalty began to rise in the
later decades of the twentieth century. 7' The occasional cause
c6lbbre case raised the specter of enormously lengthy and costly
proceedings in capital cases-Caryl Chessman's controversial
execution in California in 1960 after twelve years on death row

68 See generally Michael J. Klarman, Powell v. Alabama: The Supreme Court
Confronts "Legal Lynchings," in Carol S. Steiker, ed, Criminal Procedure Stories (Foundation 2006) (describing the minimal legal process afforded even in capital cases in many
southern jurisdictions).
69 Leonard D. Savitz, A Study in Capital Punishment, 49 J Crim L, Criminol, &
Police Sci 338, 338 (1958).
70 Raymond Paternoster, CapitalPunishment in America 187 (Lexington 1991).
71 See Phoebe C. Ellsworth and Lee Ross, Public Opinion and CapitalPunishment:A
Close Examination of the Views of Abolitionists and Retentionists,29 Crime & Delinq 116,
142 (1983) (finding that 73.4 percent of respondents thought that the death penalty cost
taxpayers less than life imprisonment).
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was said to cost the state $500,000 72-but such examples were
rarely emphasized in mid-century death penalty debates, 73 and
they failed to shake settled assumptions about the relative (lesser) cost of capital punishment vis-h-vis imprisonment.

II. THE EMERGENCE OF COST AS A CONSIDERATION
IN THE POST-FURMAN ERA

Cost was not a significant part of the death penalty debate
in the decade preceding the Court's invalidation of existing capital punishment schemes in 1972. Nor was it salient in the debates surrounding the Court's approval of several new capital
statutes in 1976. But the forces that produced the 1972 and 1976
decisions-and the decisions themselves-inaugurated the modem era of capital punishment. As this section recounts, the cost
of capital punishment would increase significantly in the modern
era in response to the constitutionalization of death penalty law
and eventually the question of cost would emerge as a central
issue surrounding the American capital system.
A.

Reconsideration of the Death Penalty and the Emergence of
the Modern Era

The American death penalty began a significant decline beginning in the 1960s. After executions in the United States
reached their peak in the 1930s (averaging over 150 executions
per year, nationwide), executions steadily declined over the next
two decades (averaging about 72 executions per year in the
1950s). 74 The number of executions declined even further in the

72 See A Bill to Abolish the Death Penalty under All Laws of the United States, and
for Other Purposes, Hearings on S 1760 before the Subcommittee on Criminal Law and
Procedures of the Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong, 1st Sess 107 (1968) (1968
Subcommittee Hearings). For an extensive treatment of the salience of Chessman's execution in death penalty debates of the time, see generally Theodore Hamm, Rebel and a
Cause:Caryl Chessman and the Politicsof the Death Penalty in Postwar California,19481974 (California 2001).
73 In the 1968 hearings on a federal bill to abolish the death penalty, the argument
that the cost of capital punishment exceeded the cost of imprisonment (with the
Chessman case as the prime example) appeared only briefly in the hundreds of pages of
testimony assembled by the Senate subcommittee, and, tellingly, appeared nowhere in
the submission from the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress in its
lengthy summary of "pro and con arguments" on capital punishment. See 1968
Subcommittee Hearings at 172-99 (cited in note 72).
71 Herbert H. Haines, Against Capital Punishment: The Anti-Death Penalty Movement in America, 1972-1994 12 (Oxford 1996); William J. Bowers, Executions in America
41 (DC Heath 1974).
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1960s (fewer than 20 executions per year), 75 and a de facto moratorium on executions was achieved in 1967, inaugurating a decade-long period without executions in the United States.
The decline in executions was caused in part by a decline in
prosecutorial efforts to seek and obtain the death penalty (death
sentences declined significantly between the late 1930s and the
1960s, as prosecutors and sentencers increasingly exercised their
76
discretion to avoid seeking and imposing capital punishment).
But the drop in executions was also caused by the inability of
states to consummate death sentences with executions in light of
the increasing federal constitutional supervision of state criminal
justice systems by the federal courts. Beginning in the late
1950s, the Warren Court extended many of the procedural protections in the Bill of Rights to state trials, vastly expanding the
available challenges to criminal convictions. At the same time,
the US Supreme Court, in 1963, gave the first indication that the
Constitution might impose constraints specifically targeting the
death penalty itself: three justices expressed the view that the
death penalty might be excessive punishment for the crime of
rape. 77 That opinion galvanized the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
to wage a war against the American death penalty; the Fund's
lawyers successfully conducted a "moratorium" campaign to
bring executions in the country to a halt by aggressively challenging capital convictions and sentences via the newly expanded
reservoir of federal constitutional rights.78 Emboldened by the
Supreme Court's apparent interest in the death penalty, the
Fund's lawyers also constructed a distinctive set of arguments
challenging the administration of capital punishment in the
United States. 79 Apart from these legal challenges to particular
convictions and sentences, there was also significant political
reconsideration of the death penalty during this era. Several
states legislatively limited or abolished capital punishment in
the mid-1960s, following Oregon's successful popular referendum
to withdraw the death penalty in 1964.
75 Bowers, Executions in America at 12 (cited in note 74).
76 Id at 11.

77 Rudolph v Alabama, 375 US 889, 889 (1963) (Goldberg dissenting) ("[Dloes the
imposition of the death penalty by those States which retain it for rape violate 'evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of [our] maturing society' or 'standards of
decency more or less universally accepted?").
78 Michael Meltsner, Cruel and Unusual: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment 30-31 (Random House 1973).
79 Carol S. Steiker, Furman v. Georgia- Not an End, But a Beginning, in John Blume
and Jordan Steiker, eds, Death Penalty Stories 99-100 (Foundation 2009).

134

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2010:

This era of declining death sentences and executions,
marked as well by withdrawal of the death penalty in six jurisdictions,8 0 generated extensive public debate about the status of
capital punishment. Throughout the period, there was substantial overlap in the political and legal arguments against the
death penalty; indeed, the lawyers who led the constitutional
assault against the death penalty were in many respects the
leaders of the abolitionist movement during this era (although
there were also numerous abolitionist organizations operating at
81
the state level).
Perhaps the most prominent attack against the death penalty concerned its distribution, as opponents challenged its arbitrary and discriminatory application. With death sentences and
executions in decline, it became clear that very few murderers or
rapists would actually receive the punishment, yet there were
few safeguards to ensure that those who met that fate were truly
the "worst of the worst" offenders. The problem was aggravated
by two procedural features of the American death penalty. First,
states had failed to develop any standards for the imposition of
the death penalty, so that prosecutors and jurors were essentially unguided in choosing whether a particular defendant should
live or die.8 2 Although this unguided discretion was thought to be
an improvement relative to the mandatory capital statutes of the
nineteenth century (under which death sentences were required
upon conviction for certain offenses), the absence of state standards seemed especially striking given the high stakes of the decision and emerging notions of due process. By the 1960s, a typical
state sentencing statute simply called for the sentencer to choose
between life and death based on the sentencer's own sense of
whether the circumstances called for "mercy."8 3 Second, in many
states there was no separate phase of the trial during which the
defendant could present evidence and arguments solely relating
to the appropriate punishment.8 4 Accordingly, sentencers would
often have to make their decision without the benefit of the
strongest arguments in mitigation of punishment.
80 Haines, Against Capital Punishment at 13 (cited in note 74) (describing full aboli-

tion in Oregon and Iowa and abolition save for extraordinary offenses in West Virginia,
Vermont, New York, and New Mexico).
81 Id at 12-13.
82 Carol S. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on
Two Decades of ConstitutionalRegulation of Capital Punishment, 109 Harv L Rev 355,
364 (1995).
83 Id.
84 McGautha v California,402 US 183, 208 (1971).
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Concerns about discriminatory use of the death penalty
stemmed from its obviously racially tilted use, particularly in the
South. The Supreme Court's concern about the appropriateness
of the death penalty for rape was likely motivated at least in part
by the fact that the punishment was applied virtually exclusively
against African American offenders convicted of raping white
victims. All of the 455 executions for the crime of rape in the several decades preceding the modern era were conducted in southern states, states bordering the South, and the District of
Columbia.8 5 Between 1930 and 1967, African Americans accounted for about 90 percent of the defendants executed nationwide for rape but for less than 50 percent of those executed for
murder.8 6 As the Fund implemented its moratorium strategy,
one of its first efforts was to commission a study of the role of
race in capital rape cases in Arkansas, a study which documented significant racial bias and which provided the foundation for
87
an equal protection challenge to the death penalty.
Opponents of the death penalty also believed that capital
punishment no longer comported with American values. They
pointed to the decline in death sentencing and executions as evidence of an absence of political will; despite widespread statutory
authorization for the penalty (including for many crimes other
than murder), its increasingly rare use suggested a disconnect
between the law on the books and prevailing moral commitments. The civil rights movement, the Vietnam War, and the
broad social upheaval of the 1960s had generated considerable
skepticism about the benign character of governmental power,
and the strength of these forces is reflected in the one Gallup poll
in American history-in 1966-that shows more Americans answering negatively than affirmatively the simple question
whether they favored the death penalty for a person convicted of
murder.8 8 Moreover, opponents insisted that the few death sentences obtained during this period were tainted by jury selection
procedures, which allowed prosecutors to remove from the prospective pool any jurors harboring doubts about the wisdom of
the death penalty. "Death qualification" of capital juries insulat85 Marvin E. Wolfgang, Racial Discrimination in the Death Sentence for Rape, in
Bowers, Executions in America at 113 (cited in note 74).
86 Meltsner, Cruel and Unusual at 75 (cited in note 78).
87 Id at 78 (describing the Wolfgang study).
88 Frank Newport, In U.S., Two-Thirds Continue to Support Death Penalty (Gallup
2010),
online
at
httpV//www.gallup.con3polW123638/In-U.S.-Two-Thirds-ContinueSupport-Death-Penalty.aspx (visited Aug 21, 2010).
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ed capital prosecutions from declining public support, as the jurors seated for service were uncommonly willing to produce capi89
tal verdicts.
The decline in public support was in part a reflection of a
changing attitude toward the purposes of punishment. By the
mid-1960s, retributive justifications for punishment had fallen
from favor and rehabilitation was widely embraced as a respectable if not urgent penological goal. Retributivism's decline is evident in the California Supreme Court's declaration in 1965 that
there "is no place in the [criminal law] scheme for punishment
for its own sake, the product simply of vengeance or retribution."90 There was also increased skepticism about the death
penalty's deterrent value, and with these justifications vulnerable, opponents insisted that the death penalty was excessive, unnecessary punishment.
Thus, the attack on the death penalty was many pronged,
challenging both the administration of the punishment as well as
its basic justifications. To the extent "cost" was an issue at this
time, it was presumptively a pro-death penalty argument. Opponents of the death penalty did not generally point to the cost of
capital punishment as an affirmative reason to limit or abolish
it; rather, most mentions of cost tended to be framed as rebuttals
to the pro-death penalty affirmative case. For example, in
Furman v Georgia itself, the five Justices who supported the
judgment invalidating existing capital statutes wrote lengthy,
wide-ranging critiques of the American death penalty. 91 The
opinions discussed in detail the challenges described above concerning the distribution of the death penalty, the evidence of declining contemporary support for the punishment, and the failure of the American death penalty to yield any palpable benefits
given its rare imposition. In the 150 pages or so of argument, the
sole mention of cost was offered by Justice Marshall to rebut the
claim that the death penalty is a cheaper alternative than imprisonment: "As for the argument that it is cheaper to execute a
capital offender than to imprison him for life, even assuming
that such an argument, if true, would support a capital sanction,
92
it is simply incorrect."
89 Witherspoon v Illinois, 391 US 510, 519-21 (1968).
90 In re Estrada,408 P2d 948, 952 (Cal 1965).
91 Furman v Georgia, 408 US 238, 242-47 (1972) (Douglas concurring); id at 305-06
(Brennan concurring); id at 309-10 (Stewart concurring); id at 311-12 (White concurring); id at 316-20 (Marshall concurring).
92 Id at 357 (Marshall concurring).
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The absence of the cost argument in the various opinions
stems in part from the fact that the cost argument is not a constitutional argument against the death penalty (though it might
be part of a constitutional defense of the punishment, in response
to the claim that the death penalty serves no valid state goals).
The Constitution does not condemn state inefficiency. But the
absence of the argument is likely also attributable to the widespread belief (and perhaps reality) that the death penalty was
comparatively cheaper than imprisonment. At the time of
Furman and indeed well into the 1980s, supporters of the death
penalty were much more likely than opponents to list "the cost of
93
the death penalty" as a reason supporting their position.
B.

The Transformation of Capital Practices and the New Cost
of Capital Punishment

Furman itself, though, would radically reshape the economics of capital punishment. By embarking on a course of constitutional regulation of capital punishment, the Court would significantly increase the costs of capital litigation. Neither the increase in costs nor the shift in public opinion would occur overnight. It would take more than a quarter century before the conventional wisdom regarding the comparatively higher cost of imprisonment would give way to a new, widespread belief that the
death penalty was substantially more expensive than the alternative of imprisonment-even life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole.
The post-Furman revolution in capital practice began with
the redrafting of state capital statutes. After Furman, states
sought to redress the constitutional objections voiced by the concurring opinions. Many states, following the example of the
Model Penal Code, adopted "guided discretion" statutes, which
specified aggravating circumstances necessary to justify the imposition of death (above and beyond the crime of murder). Such
states also required bifurcated proceedings, with a separate penalty phase focused solely on whether the defendant should live or
die. Other states sought to cure the problem of unbridled discretion by returning to the long-discarded mandatory death penalty.
When five of the new statutes reached the Court in 1976, the
Court upheld the guided discretion schemes and invalidated the
93 Phoebe C. Ellsworth and Samuel R. Gross, Hardeningof the Attitudes: Americans'
Views on the Death Penalty, in Hugo Adam Bedau, ed, The Death Penalty in America:
Current Controversies 98 (Oxford 2d ed 1997).
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mandatory ones. 94 The key opinion reviving the American death
penalty was offered by a plurality of three Justices in Gregg v
Georgia.9 5 The opinion endorsed as a general matter the value of
bifurcated proceedings 96 and the feasibility of developing standards to guide capital sentencing. 97 It then reviewed the particular mix of procedural protections Georgia had developed in response to Furman, including its narrower scope of death eligibility (via its enumeration of ten aggravating factors), its authorization for jurors to consider mitigating factors and to return a
nondeath verdict based on such considerations, and its provision
for automatic appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court (requiring
that court to determine in each case in which a death verdict is
returned whether the sentence "was imposed under the influence
of passion or prejudice,"9 8 whether evidence supports the finding
of an aggravating circumstance, and whether the sentence is
disproportionate compared to those imposed in similar cases). 99
According to the Gregg Court, the Georgia scheme facially met
the challenge of Furman because "[n]o longer should there be 'no
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the
death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is
not."'' 100 At the same time, the Woodson v North Carolinaplurality, in rejecting the mandatory death penalty, endorsed a foundational principle of its newly emerging capital jurisprudence, that
"death is a punishment different from all other sanctions in kind
rather than degree." 10 1
The 1976 decisions thus chartered a course of continuing
federal constitutional regulation of the death penalty. The decisions did not make clear what mix of procedural protections
would be adequate to satisfy constitutional commands, but they
did suggest strongly that any procedures must accommodate the
"qualitative" difference between life and death. 10 2 Over the ensuing years, the costs associated with administering the death
penalty would increase dramatically. First and foremost, the
94 Gregg v Georgia, 428 US 153, 206-08 (1976); Proffitt v Florida,428 US 242, 25960 (1976); Jurek v Texas, 428 US 262, 276 (1976); Woodson v North Carolina,428 US 280,
305 (1976); Roberts v Louisiana,431 US 633, 637-38 (1977).
95 Gregg,428 US at 158.
96 Id at 190-91.
97 Id at 193.
98 Id at 198.
99 Gregg, 428 US at 198.
100 Id at 198, quoting Furman,408 US at 313 (White concurring).
101 Woodson, 428 US at 303-04.
102 Id at 305.
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costs of capital trials would grow exponentially, as the new model of bifurcated proceedings with a focused punishment phase
would gradually become the national norm. The "death is different" doctrine would substantially alter many capital trial practices, including voir dire, the use of experts, the expectations of
counsel, and the increased focus on investigating and presenting
mitigation evidence. In addition, post-trial litigation costs would
become vastly greater in capital cases, including the cost of direct appeals, state post-conviction, and federal habeas. The
growth of state death rows, resulting from the combination of
increased capital sentencing, extensive, time-consuming appellate and post-conviction review, and high reversal rates, would
also add substantially to capital costs, as the cost of death-row
incarceration in many states far exceeded the cost of ordinary
(noncapital) incarceration. The transformation of American capital practices would occur over several decades. This transformation would substantially increase the cost of capital punishment relative to imprisonment in most (if not all) jurisdictions,
and as this underlying reality changed, so too would the perception of whether "cost" was a pro- or anti-death-penalty consideration.
Prior to Furman, capital murder trials throughout the
United States were not appreciably different from noncapital
ones. The length and complexity of capital and noncapital murder trials were comparable, and the level of resources devoted to
capital trials was extraordinarily low compared to the present
day. Although there is considerable variation even today in the
conduct of capital trials, it is beyond doubt that such trials are
more extensive and expensive along virtually every dimension.
The first and perhaps most significant development in postFurman practice concerns the standard of practice in preparing
for a capital case. Pre-Furman,trial counsel focused primarily on
the question of guilt or innocence, given that many states did not
encourage or in some cases even allow presentation of evidence
relating solely to punishment. Lawyers who litigated capital
cases were drawn from the same general pool of attorneys who
litigated serious felonies, and there was no expectation of specialized training or knowledge relating to the fact that the death
penalty was an option at sentencing. Gradually, the expectations
surrounding capital trial investigation and preparation substantially changed. The extent of those changes are reflected in the
American Bar Association's (ABA) promulgation of Guidelines
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for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, first in 1989 and then again in 2003.103 The 1989
Guidelines extensively describe the "minimum" requirements for
capital representation, including, among other things, appropriate client contact, motion practice, investigation, expert assistance, plea negotiation efforts, and voir dire strategy.1 0 4 The most
detailed and significant section concerns "the defense case at the
sentencing phase," which directs counsel to investigate a wide
range of mitigating evidence; the commentary indicates that the
punishment phase is more like a "separate trial" than noncapital
sentencing proceedings and that "the sentencing phase stands
outside normal criminal trial practice." 10 5 The 2003 revised
Guidelines significantly expand the areas of expected preparation, "underscor[ing] the range and importance of expert testimony in capital cases, the breadth of mitigating evidence, and
counsel's duty to present arguments in mitigation." 10 6 Both sets
of Guidelines also emphasize the importance of ensuring that
states develop a system for selecting and adequately compensating capital counsel. 10 7 The 2003 Guidelines provide considerably
more detail about the minimum requirements in this regard,
specifying that the "defense team" should include at least two
attorneys, an investigator, and a mitigation specialist, as well as
funding for "all expert, investigative, and other ancillary professional services reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide
high quality legal representation at every stage of the proceedings."1 0 s
In the 1970s and 1980s, many (indeed, most) states did not
come close to meeting the standards embodied in the 1989
Guidelines (much less those in the 2003 Guidelines). The ABA
was not attempting to codify prevailing practices so much as to
articulate "best practices." Indeed, the ABA's call for a moratorium on executions in 1997 was premised in large part on the distance between the actual protections afforded defendants within
state systems and what the ABA regarded as minimally neces103 American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (ABA 2003), online at http//www.abanet.org/death
penalty/resources/doc/2003Guidelines.pdf (visited Aug 19, 2010).
104 American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (ABA 1989), online at httpv/www.abanet.org/death
penalty/resourcesdocgl989Guidelines.pdf (visited Aug 19, 2010).
105 Id.
106 American Bar Association Guidelines (2003) (cited in note 103).
107 Id.
108 Id.
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sary to ensure fairness and accuracy in capital litigation. 109 The
Guidelines have nonetheless been influential in changing the
expectations for capital defense, both in terms of attorney performance and state financial support for capital defense. Moreover, the Supreme Court's invocation of the Guidelines in several
cases finding attorney performance constitutionally deficient has
certainly reinforced such expectations, as the Court has seemingly adopted a significantly more demanding Sixth Amendment
approach in capital cases. 110
The higher cost of preparing for capital trials-including
mitigation investigation, retaining experts for both guiltinnocence and punishment phase issues, extensive motions practice-carries forward to the capital trial itself. A few years before
Furman,the Court placed constitutional limits on state efforts to
exclude for cause potential jurors harboring some doubts about
the death penalty. 1 1' The Court subsequently recognized a defendant's constitutionally protected interest in having the opportunity to conduct sufficient voir dire to identify jurors willing to
consider mitigating evidence (and to entertain the possibility of
returning a sentence other than death). 1 2 Over time, these constitutional decisions have transformed voir dire from a relatively
short process aimed at culling the most extreme potential jurors
to an extraordinarily intricate, strategic, time-consuming process. Capital defense organizations have developed extensive
training materials to educate trial lawyers about their critical
choices in conducting voir dire, and the leading defense approach-the so-called "Colorado Method"-encourages lawyers to
conduct extensive voir dire to rate prospective jurors along a seven-point scale so as to secure a jury favorably disposed to the
consideration of mitigating evidence."13 In some jurisdictions,
voir dire consumes as much time and resources as the trial itself; in one upcoming Connecticut case illustrating the extreme
possibilities in this regard, involving a high-profile crime with

109 American Bar Association, ABA

Study: State Death Penalty Systems Deeply

Flawed (ABA 2007), online at http//www.abanet.org/abanet/media/release/news-release.
cfm?releaseid=209 (visited Aug 19, 2010).
110 See, for example, Wiggins v Smith, 539 US 510, 524 (2003); Rompilla v Beard, 545
US 374, 376 n 7 (2005).
11 Witherspoon, 391 US at 521-23.
112 Morgan v Illinois, 504 US 719, 733-34 (1992).
113 The Life Penalty, About the Colorado Method of Jury Selection (The Life Penalty
2008), online at http/www.thelifepenalty.con/colorado-method.htm (visited Aug 19,
2010).
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extensive pretrial publicity, voir dire is expected to take six
114
months to complete.
Perhaps the clearest indication of the higher cost of capital
trials is the substantial decline in death sentences over the past
fifteen years. In the mid-1990s, the yearly number of death sentences obtained nationwide averaged about 326.115 Since that
time, capital sentences have declined over 60 percent, with annual death sentences over the past three years hovering around
112.116 This remarkable decline in death sentences is not attributable to the relatively modest decline in murders during the
fifteen-year period (in fact, the murder rate has remained virtually constant from 2000 to 2007, at the same time that death
sentences dropped about 50 percent). 117 Although there is no

comprehensive data definitively establishing the causes of the
decline (such as the number of cases in which death is sought or
the percentage of cases in which the sentencer returns a death
verdict), the available evidence points to the decreased willingness of district attorneys to seek the death penalty, in large part
because of cost concerns. Prosecutors declining to seek death
have repeatedly defended their decisions on cost-cutting
grounds, 118 and numerous editorials and news reports have
brought public attention and scrutiny to expensive cases in
which prosecutors chose to seek death. 119

114 Richard Meehan, Jr., Jury Selection in Capital Case an Arduous, Tricky Process,
Norwich Bulletin (Jan 21, 2010), online at http;//www.norwichbulletin.conVopinions/
columnists/x867959314/Richard- Meehan -Jr-Jury- selection- in- capital -case-an-arduoustricky-process (visited Aug 19, 2010).
115 Death Penalty Information Center, Death Sentences in the United States from 1977
to 2008, online at http//www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-united-states-19772008 (visited Aug 20, 2010).
116 Id.
117 Death Penalty Information Center, Death Sentences Have Dropped Considerably in
the Current Decade, online at http//www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-sentenceshave-dropped-considerably-current-decade (visited Aug 20, 2010).
118 See, for example, Patrick Orr, Idaho ProsecutorsOpting Not to Seek DeathPenalty,
Idaho Statesman (Nov 3, 2009), online at http;//www.idahostatesman.con/2009/
11/03/959060/idaho-prosecutors-opting-not-to.html (visited Aug 20, 2010); Jimmie E.
Gates, Budget Kills Hinds Capital Cases, Clarion-Ledger Al (Oct 26, 2009).
119 See, for example, Logan Carver, Death PenaltyCases More Expensive than Lifetime
Imprisonment, But Local CDA Says Cost Never a Consideration,Lubbock Avalanche-J
(Dec 13, 2009), online at http/Ilubbockonline.conVstoriesl2l39/loc_ 535156806.shtml
(visited Aug 20, 2010); Shawn Day, Virginia's Budget Woes Slow Down Capital Cases,
Virginian-Pilot (Dec 7, 2009), online at http/hamptonroads.com/2009/12/state°/%E20/
80%99s-budget-woes-bring-slowdown-capital-cases (visited Aug 20, 2010); Russell Gold,
Counties Struggle with High Cost of ProsecutingDeath-Penalty Cases-Result Is Often
Higher Taxes, Less Spending on Services, Wall St J Bi (Jan 9, 2002); Jon Murray, Is
Death Penalty Worth the Price?,Indianapolis Star Al (Dec 10, 2009).
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As between trial costs and post-trial appellate costs, the
lion's share of increased costs in capital cases is incurred at
trial.120 But the post-trial costs in capital cases are also
significantly higher than those in noncapital cases. Death
penalty jurisdictions typically provide for appellate review as a
matter of right in the highest state criminal court, whereas in
many states such review is discretionary in noncapital cases.
Briefing on direct appeal is often very extensive in capital cases,
as defendants raise a wide range of claims distinctive to capital
proceedings (wholly apart from garden-variety state and federal
claims available to both capital and noncapital defendants). In
many jurisdictions, such as California, the direct appeal process
can consume several years, with delays attributable to such
mundane tasks as producing an agreed-upon transcript of the
proceeding and more substantive tasks, including elaborate
briefing on both sides (often totaling several hundreds of pages)
and the issuance of an opinion. 121
State and federal habeas proceedings likewise consume significant time and resources. In virtually all states, indigent inmates sentenced to incarceration are not entitled to statecompensated counsel on state habeas, so the vast majority of
noncapital state habeas applications are filed pro se and accorded summary review. Capital inmates, though, are generally provided counsel for state habeas litigation (a post-Furman development), and prevailing norms of practice require extensive investigation in these proceedings. Indeed, state habeas proceedings, though colloquially viewed as part of the "appeals" process,
are more appropriately understood to constitute a separate "trial" regarding factual matters outside of the original trial record
(such as the effectiveness of trial counsel and the compliance of
prosecutors with their duty to disclose exculpatory evidence). 122
In some states, state habeas proceedings can last many years
(sometimes more than a decade), as the state habeas court sorts
out the various allegations of error surrounding the original trial
and direct appeal. The cost of state habeas proceedings has increased markedly over the past fifteen years, as many states
120 American Law Institute, Report of the Council to the Membership of the American
Law Institute on the Matter of the Death Penalty 35 (ALI 2009).
121 Carol S. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker, A Tale of Two Nations: Implementation of
the Death Penalty in "Executing"Versus "Symbolic" States in the United States, 84 Tex L
Rev 1869, 1876-79 (2006) (describing the extensiveness of California capital practice on
direct appeal).
122 Id.
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have increased the availability of funds for habeas investigation.
States' efforts in this regard are partly attributable to federal
legislation, as federal habeas reform in the mid-1990s included
benefits (in terms of streamlined federal habeas review) for
states that established systems for the appointment and reasonable compensation of competent counsel on state habeas (though
123
virtually no states have received such benefits to date).
Federal habeas, like state habeas, involves substantial costs
for death-sentenced inmates and minimal costs for non-capitally
sentenced inmates. In 1988, Congress created a right to counsel
for indigent death-sentenced inmates, 124 leaving all other indigent inmates with no comparable right. Although the scope of
federal habeas review has narrowed over the past twenty-five
years (both statutorily, with the passage of the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) in 1996, and as a matter of judicial decision' 25 ), federal habeas proceedings remain
both time-consuming and expensive. The growth of procedural
defenses on habeas (for example, statute of limitations, nonretroactivity doctrine, limited right to evidentiary hearing, deference to state fact-finding, rigorous enforcement of state procedural defaults) has certainly made it much more difficult for
death-sentenced inmates to receive merits review of their constitutional claims, 126 and AEDPA's new standard of review, insulating wrong but "reasonable" state court adjudications, has also
127
contributed to the lower reversal rate in recent years.
Nonetheless, federal habeas litigation remains intricate and protracted; federal courts likely expend as much energy resolving
threshold procedural questions as they previously devoted to the
28
merits of federal constitutional claims.1
123 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), 28 USC §§ 2261-66
(2006).
124 21 USC § 848(q)(4)(B) (2006), repealed by Pub L 109-177, 120 Stat 231, 232.
125 See, for example, Teague v Lane, 489 US 288 (1989) (crafting broad rule of nonretroactivity in cases involving "new" rules of constitutional criminal procedure); Coleman
v Thompson, 501 US 722 (1991) (applying strict rule of procedural default to federal constitutional claims lost in state court because of late filing on appeal).
126 Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-Conviction Review of Federal Constitutional
Claims Raised by State Prisoners:Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism,
1998 U Chi Legal F 315, 323-37 (1998).
127 Nancy J. King, Fred L. Cheesman II, and Brian J. Ostrom, Final Technical Report:
Habeas Litigation in U.S. District Courts: An Empirical Study of Habeas Corpus Cases
Filed by State Prisoners under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death PenaltyAct of 1996
at 9 (NCJRS 2007), online at http/www.ncjrs.gov/pdffflesl/ni/grantW/219559.pdf (visited
Aug 20, 2010).
128 Jordan Steiker, 1998 U Chi Legal F at 323-27 (cited in note 126).
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Overall, the post-trial litigation costs in capital cases have
been significant, especially in the two decades or so following the
constitutionalization of capital punishment in Furman and the
conditional approval of the new capital punishment statutes in
the 1976 cases. As state and federal courts sorted out the somewhat discordant messages from the US Supreme Court regarding the constitutional prerequisites of state capital schemes, the
overall reversal rate was staggering: courts overturned close to
70 percent of capital sentences or convictions reviewed during
that period.1 29 Most of the reversals were attributable to the intricacies of capital sentencing law, 130 and the reversal rates for
non-death-sentenced offenders convicted of murder paled in
comparison (both because of the death-penalty specific character
of the doctrines generating relief and the relative absence of resources for non-death-sentenced inmates to pursue such re1 31
lief).
As a result, the average time between death sentence and
execution dramatically rose compared to pre-Furman practice.
The relative "cost" of the death penalty is no longer captured by a
simple comparison of the cost of a capital trial together with the
cost of carrying out an execution, on the one hand, versus the
cost of a noncapital trial and the cost of lengthy imprisonment,
on the other; rather, the relative cost of administering the death
penalty post-Furman now often requires a comparison of the cost
of multiple capital trials and the cost of lengthy (death-row) imprisonment and (in rare cases) the cost of the execution itself,
versus the cost of a single noncapital trial and the cost of lengthy
(noncapital) imprisonment.
In addition, even "unsuccessful" capital litigation has revealed a capacity to disrupt the imposition of the death penalty.
Most recently, inmates throughout the country have challenged
the prevailing protocol for lethal injections, claiming that the
combination of drugs poses an unacceptable risk of serious
pain.1 32 Lethal injection, of course, was adopted in the postFurman era as an alternative to electrocution (and other available modes of execution) to minimize the risk of pain as well as to
129 James S. Liebman et al, Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 19731995, 78 Tex L Rev 1839, 1861 (2000).
130 Id.
131 Id at 1854.
132 See, for example, On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of
Kentucky, Baze v Rees, No 07-5439, *2 (filed Jul 16, 2007) (available on Westlaw at 2007
WL 2781088).
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"civilize" the execution process by eliminating visible damage to
the body of the condemned; however, the prevailing protocol
(which includes a paralyzing agent, an anesthetic, and a heartstopping drug) was developed and embraced in a surprisingly ad
hoc, unreflective process. 13 3 As death penalty opponents came to
realize that inmates could suffer serious pain if inadequate anesthetic was administered and that the paralyzing agent would
mask an inmate's experience of that pain, they challenged the
protocol in state and federal court raising a variety of federal
constitutional and state law claims. The litigation substantially
slowed the rate of executions in the country, as judges and state
officials wrestled with concerns about the protocol. Eventually
the US Supreme Court agreed to address the federal constitutional claim-that the Eighth Amendment bars use of the protocol given its risks and available alternatives. 134 After agreeing to
hear the claim, the Court signaled that it would not let executions proceed using the challenged protocol until it resolved the
case; by so doing, the Court created the first "moratorium" on
executions in the modern era, lasting about seven months (from
the day after the Court granted certiorari until about three
weeks after it decided the case). The Court ultimately adopted a
relatively lenient standard for addressing such claims (the challenged execution method must present "substantial" or "objectively intolerable" risk of pain) and denied relief. 135 But even after the Court's decision, challenges to the prevailing protocol
have substantially slowed executions in many jurisdictions. This
is true partly because the Court's ruling did not extinguish challenges to the protocol available under state law, 136 and partly
because the Court's decision did not shut the door entirely to
Eighth Amendment challenges (where such challenges could be
1 37
supported by new and different facts).
The lesson of the lethal injection litigation (past and ongoing) is that the ability of states to carry out executions remains
quite fragile. 138 Yearly executions (nationwide) fell significantly
133 See, for example, Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How
Medicine Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 Fordham L Rev 49, 70-71 (2007) (detailing the history of the adoption of the lethal injection protocol in Oklahoma, which provided the model for its adoption nationwide).
134 Baze v Rees, 551 US 1192, 1192 (2007).
135 Baze v Rees, 553 US 35, 49-50 (2008).
136 See, for example, Bowling v Ky Dept of Corrections,2009 WL 4117353, *2 (Ky).
137 Nooner v Norris, 2010 WL 424439, *4 (8th Cir).
138 See, for example, Nate Jenkins, Gov. Heineman Signs Off on Lethal Injection as a
Death Penalty Method, Columbus Telegram (Nebraska) (Feb 11, 2010), online at
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in the two years that bridged the moratorium (forty-two executions in 2007 and thirty-seven in 2008) compared to the ten preceding years (1997-2006, averaging about seventy per year). 139
Despite predictions of an avalanche of executions after the Court
rejected the lethal injection challenge, the following year (2009)
produced only fifty-two executions, still well below the average of
40
seventy in the preceding decade. 1
The combined power of successful litigation and unsuccessful litigation has significantly lengthened the time between the
pronouncement of death sentences and their execution. In addition, the multiple opportunities for review at different stages and
in different courts (state and federal) allow for executions to be
avoided almost altogether in jurisdictions where there is not a
sustained political will for them to go forward. Given the intricate doctrines surrounding the implementation of the death penalty, executions require a "perfect storm" of cooperation involving
numerous actors, including local prosecutors and judges,
statewide prosecutors and judges, state executive officials, and
federal judges. Of the thirty-five states currently authorizing the
death penalty, only a handful have carried out significant numbers of executions; only five have carried out more than fifty over
the past thirty-five years, and Texas and Virginia alone account
for almost half (554) of the executions nationwide (1,193).141
Several states have obtained significant numbers of death sentences, produced quite large death-row populations, and yet conducted relatively insignificant numbers of executions. California,
Tennessee, and Pennsylvania, for example, are prominent examples of high-death-sentencing, low-executing states with a combined death-row population of 1,007 inmates and yet only twenty-two executions since 1976. (Texas, in contrast, carried out
twenty-four last year alone. 142) The 1,007 death-sentenced inmates in these three states far exceed the death-row population
of the entire country at any time prior to Furman (the national
death row at the time of Furman was only about six hundred
inmates). 143 Another group of states has the death penalty on the
httpV/columbustelegram.com/newslocaVarticle-lbb9d4c2-c866-55b3-b9f4-dd85a89fa334.
html (visited Aug 20, 2010).
139 Death Penalty Information Center, Executions by Year, online at http//www.death
penaltyinfo.org/executions-year (visited Aug 20, 2010).
140

Id.

141 Death Penalty Information Center, State by State Database(cited in note 8).
142 Id.
143 Carol S. Steiker, Furman v. Georgia: Not an End, But a Beginning at 97 (cited in
note 79).
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books, generates small but significant numbers of death sentences, and rarely conducts executions; Idaho, Oregon, and Kentucky, for example, are moderate-death-sentencing, lowexecuting states with a combined death-row population of eightyseven inmates and just six executions since Furman (five of the
executions involved inmates who had abandoned their appeals). 144 Another cluster of states rarely sentences inmates to
death and never or rarely conducts executions (and does so almost exclusively in cases where inmates abandon their appeals);
seven low-death-sentencing, low-executing states-Nebraska,
Colorado, Connecticut, Wyoming, South Dakota, Kansas, and
New Hampshire-have a combined death row of thirty-nine inmates and a total of seven executions over the past thirty-five
45
years.
The presence of a large number of death penalty states with
few or no executions has transformed the way in which the cost
of the death penalty is calculated and discussed. Instead of asking how much the death penalty would cost relative to a noncapital sanction in a particular case, the cost of the death penalty
is described in terms of the resources spent by a state per execution. This crude measure tallies all the costs incurred in the operation of a capital system and divides them by the executions
actually secured. As mentioned above, this sort of accounting
yields extraordinary figures, such as the calculation that each
execution in California costs about a quarter of a billion dollars;1 46 such an accounting would likely yield extraordinary figures for the other high-death-sentencing, low-executing states
(for example, Tennessee and Pennsylvania), as well as the moderate-death-sentencing, low-executing states with small but significant death-row populations and virtually no executions (for
example, Idaho, Oregon, and Kentucky). As noted above, a recent
study in Maryland concluded that each of the state's five executions cost approximately $37 million. 14 7 Even for the low-deathsentencing, low-executing states with extremely small death
rows, the minimum costs for operating a death penalty systemmaintaining a death row, constructing a death chamber, formalizing procedures-are substantial, especially given the virtual
absence of executions in most of those states. Hence, in New Jer144 Death Penalty Information Center, State by State Database(cited in note 8).
145

Id.

146 See note 10 and accompanying text.
147 Roman, The Cost of the Death Penalty in Maryland (cited in note 16).
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sey, a policy report indicated that the state spent over a quarter
of a billion dollars on the death penalty in the two or so decades
prior to repeal (over and above what the state would have spent
on life without possibility of parole) even though the death-row
population numbered only ten and no executions had been carried out when repeal was achieved. 148
The growth of death rows since Furman, given relatively
high death-sentencing rates in the 1980s and '90s and continued
obstacles to executions in all but a few states, has generated a
new "cost" of the death penalty that only recently has received
attention-the extra cost of death-row incarceration vis-a-vis
general population incarceration. In some states, this cost has
become a significant factor in the overall expense of the death
penalty. In states such as California, where the interval between
sentencing and execution remains high and the death-row
population is substantial, the added cost of death-row incarceration could significantly alter the comparative cost of the death
penalty.
The new accounting of the cost of capital punishment in
terms of cost per execution (as well as increased costs attributable to prolonged death-row incarceration) highlights that the
strength of the cost argument against the death penalty turns in
significant part on whether a jurisdiction actually executes offenders. Thus, the "cost" argument will have less power in places
like Virginia and Texas where the death-row populations are
declining and the cost-per-execution is low compared to "symbolic" states. 149 Virginia, for example, has carried out over 100 executions in the modern era and has a current death row of sixteen. 150 Whereas Virginia has approximately 1.6 death-row inmates for every ten consummated executions, California has approximately 538.151 This is not to say that the cost argument
against the death penalty is not applicable to Virginia; it might
be that the costs of capital trials-by far the most significant expense related to the death penalty-are sufficient to render the
death penalty more expensive than noncapital incarceration
even where sentences are consummated by executions relatively
148 Mary E. Forsberg, Money for Nothing?: The FinancialCost of New Jersey's Death
Penalty, 1 NJ Policy Persp 16 (Nov 2005).
149 See Steiker and Steiker, 84 Tex L Rev at 1870-71 (cited in note 121) (describing
abolitionist, symbolic, and executing states).
150 Death Penalty Information Center, State by State Database(cited in note 8).
151 Id (showing California to have a death-row population of 690, with only thirteen
executions in the modern era).
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quickly. Indeed, figuring out the actual financial costs and benefits of the death penalty versus incarceration is extremely difficult, and none of the current studies appear to consider all of the
potentially relevant factors (including, for example, whether the
death penalty deters crime, whether the presence of the death
penalty encourages plea bargains, or whether the death penalty
imposes significant financial costs outside the criminal justice
system by overloading state and federal courts). But in active
death penalty states, the cost calculus is likely to focus on the
cost of obtaining a death verdict in a particular case (as in the
Nichols case in Georgia or the King case in Texas), whereas in
the majority of death penalty states with relatively few or no executions, the cost of the death penalty is better expressed in
terms of maintaining a capital system. In this respect, the cost
argument-especially in the form of cost per execution-draws
attention to the difficulty of most states in securing executions.
The "cost" of capital punishment becomes recast as the cost of
nonfunctioning capital systems, where the mix of constitutional
error, high reversal rates, and lack of political will generates
highly visible expenses and little or no return in terms of executions.
III. RHETORICAL AND STRATEGIC FUNCTIONS OF
COST ARGUMENTS IN THE MODERN ERA

The simplest story to tell about the emergence of cost considerations in contemporary death penalty debates is a straightforward "changed circumstances" story: the cost of administering
capital punishment rose steeply in the modern era of constitutional regulation, during a period in which criminal justice costs
more generally were also rising sharply as a consequence of increased rates of incarceration across the country. 152 Concerns
about the relatively higher cost of capital punishment vis-h-vis
imprisonment look like a natural consequence of new budgetary
constraints, especially in these past two years of financial crisis.
We contend, however, that this simple story is incomplete. Rather, while the cost argument's appearance may be the product
of changed fiscal realities, it owes its special prominence and
power to the way in which the cost argument can be deployed,
152 See The Pew Center on the States, One in 31: The Long Reach of American Corrections (Pew Charitable Trusts 2009), online at http/www.pewcenteronthestates.org/

uploadedFiles/PSPP_lin3lreport FINALWEB_3-26-09.pdf (visited Aug 20, 2010) (detailing the exponential growth of the US prison population since the 1980s and its state
budgetary repercussions).
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rhetorically and strategically, at this particular moment in the
long history of controversy over capital punishment.
In the last significant period of heightened doubt and debate
about the American death penalty-the 1960s and the period
immediately preceding Furman-abolitionists drew heavily on
arguments about human dignity and equality, 153 as reflected in
154
several of the opinions by the Justices of the Furmanmajority.
The heyday of such arguments, however, was short-lived (as was
the abolition wrought by the Furman decision itself). In the
years that followed Furman and the reauthorization of capital
punishment in Gregg v Georgia155 and its companion cases in
1976, these arguments lost decisively in the court of American
public opinion.
The first evidence of their widespread rejection was in the
immediate outrage engendered by the Furman decision and the
massive backlash that followed, leading thirty-five states and the
federal government to approve new death penalty statutes by
1976.156 Moreover, in the decades that followed the initial legislative backlash to Furman,many states began to employ their new
capital statutes vigorously, culminating in execution rates that
far exceeded those of the 1960s.1 57 Meanwhile, during the same
decades, Europe embraced abolition on grounds substantially
similar to those so clearly rejected in the United States-that the
essential dignity and equality of all people precluded the death
penalty as a matter of fundamental human rights. 158 The United
153 See Haines, Against CapitalPunishment at 21-28 (cited in note 74) (discussing the
relationship between capital punishment advocacy and the movement for racial equality);
Gerald H. Gottlieb, CapitalPunishment, 15 Crim & Delinq 1, 14 (1969) (leading abolitionist arguing against the death penalty on several grounds, most prominently because
"[tihe act by the State tends to cheapen the values that refer to humanity itself, to lower
the opinion of humanity regarding itself, and to diminish its standards of decency and
conscience").
154 See Furman, 408 US at 250-52 (Douglas concurring) (focusing primarily on discrimination in the application of the death penalty); id at 265 (Brennan concurring) (focusing primarily on the death penalty's incompatibility with human dignity); id at 317-23
(Marshall concurring) (developing arguments similar to those of both Douglas and
Brennan, while also appealing to informed public opinion and rejecting retribution and
vengeance as valid penological goals).
155 Gregg, 428 US at 206-07.
156 See Carol S. Steiker, Furman v. Georgia: Not an End, But a Beginning at 103-06
(cited in note 79).
157 See Haines, Against Capital Punishment at 12 (cited in note 74) (noting that the
United States executed fewer than twenty people per year during the 1960s); see also
Death Penalty Information Center, Facts about the Death Penalty (2010), online at
http/www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documentE/FactSheet.pdf (visited Aug 20, 2010) (showing that, during the 1990s, that number of executions averaged close to fifty).
158 See, generally, William A. Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in
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States remained staunchly resistant to this framing of the issue
as one of human rights-in part, no doubt, simply to defend its
robust death penalty practices, but also in part because the
Supreme Court had so clearly rejected abolitionist arguments as
a matter of constitutional rights: "It is hard for American political leaders to articulate, or for members of the American public
to accept, that our much vaunted constitution could validate
something that constituted a violation of international human
159
rights.
Other forces in the United States also contributed to the
marginalization of abolitionist arguments premised on dignity
and equality. First, in criminal justice generally, the United
States saw a revival of retributivism as the leading theory of
punishment, both among scholars and the public. 160 Retributivism's insistence on proportional punishment as a matter of the
offender's "just deserts" offers powerful support to death penalty
proponents, who maintain that only death is a proportional punishment for at least some heinous murders. Moreover, retributive theory itself has a strong basis in the values of both dignity
and equality: inflicting proportional punishment on an offender
respects the offender's dignity by treating the offender as the
autonomous author of his own punishment, and it respects the
equality of his victim by balancing or annulling the offender's act
of degradation. 161 Thus, the turn to retributivism sapped appeals
to dignity and equality of their abolitionist force by investing
them with countervailing punitive force. This commandeering of
appeals to dignity and equality as arguments in favor of, rather
than against, harsh punishment can be seen most clearly in the
powerful "victims' rights" movement of the 1980s and 1990s,
which emphasized the dignitary and equality interests of crime
victims, as opposed to defendants. 162 In addition, the specific
equality concern of the 1960s-the NAACP Legal Defense Fund's
International Law (Cambridge 2d ed 1997) (documenting the death penalty abolition
movement in the context of evolving European and international human-rights norms).
159 See Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, 81 Or L
Rev 97, 129 (2002).
160 See David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L Rev 1623, 1623
(1992) (describing the "vigorous ... revival" of retributivism to dominance as a theory of
criminal punishment).
161 See Jeffrey H. Reiman, Justice, Civilization, and the Death Penalty: Answering
Ernest van den Haag, 14 Phil & Pub Affairs 115, 122-25 (1985) (contrasting "Hegelian,"
equality-based retributivism with "Kantian," rationality-based retributivism).
162 See, generally, Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Wave of Crime Victims' Rights: Standing, Remedy, and Review, 2005 BYU L Rev 255 (2005) (describing successes of victims'
rights movement and arguing for further expansions).
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concern, echoed in Justice Douglas's Furman opinion, that the
death penalty was being used disproportionately against black
offenders-was undercut by the surge in violent crime in the
1970s and 1980s and the pervasive association of race and violent crime in the public mind, 163 as reflected in the success of the
"Willie Horton" strategy of Republican strategists during the
1988 presidential campaign. 16 4 In such an environment, abolitionist arguments based on racial disparities in the administration of the death penalty were not only unlikely to carry the day,
they may have even backfired by reinforcing, in some minds, the
association of race and violent crime.
Thus, the cost argument arose in the United States in an era
in which the dignitary and equality arguments that prevailed in
abolitionist movements in Europe and elsewhere were weakened
by a variety of concomitant forces. The appeal of the cost argument in a time of such erosion is that it permits abolitionists, as
well as those sympathetic to restrictions on the use of capital
punishment in the United States, to essentially change the subject. Instead of being forced into a "soft on crime" rhetoric of
sympathy for the dignity and equality of heinous murderers, abolitionists have used the cost argument to hack three new trails
off the well-worn paths of the death penalty debates of the recent
past.
First, the cost argument has allowed abolitionists to make a
sharp rhetorical turn away from the humanitarian cast of their
prior arguments. Instead of premising the abolitionist case on
the human rights or constitutional rights of convicted murderers,
abolitionists can focus on the interests of the collective by emphasizing the necessity of cost-cutting and the alternative collective goods that inevitably compete with capital punishment for
funding. The recent abolitionist effort in Colorado to tie legislative repeal of the death penalty to increased funding for the investigation of unsolved murders ("cold cases") is a clear example
of the turn from focusing on the condemned to focusing on alternative collective goods.' 65 Similarly, abolitionists have long fo163 See, for example, Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley, Public Perceptions of Race and
Crime: The Role of Racial Stereotypes, 41 Am J Pol Sci 375, 393 (1997); Mark Peffley, Jon
Hurwitz, and Paul M. Sniderman, Racial Stereotypes and Whites' Political Views of
Blacks in the Context of Welfare and Crime, 41 Am J Pol Sci 30, 52 (1997).
164 For a description of the lasting repercussions of the use Republican strategists
made of Michael Dukakis's furlough of black convict Willie Horton to defeat his 1988
presidential bid, see David C. Anderson, Crime and the Politics of Hysteria: How the
Willie Horton Story ChangedAmerican Justice (Times 1995).
165 See Carroll and Weissmann, Revisit Death Penalty Bill, Denver Post at Bll (cited
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cused on the extremely long periods that condemned inmates
spend on death row awaiting their executions. In the past, abolitionists have focused primarily on the cruelty to the condemned
of such long, uncertain waits in such heavily restricted facilities, 166 but now the length of stay on death row has become as
much an argument about the often enormous differential cost of
death row versus incarceration in the general population.167 The
large size of the overall cost differential between capital and
noncapital sentencing allows abolitionists to argue, with some
plausibility, that alternative uses of the funds currently used to
support capital punishment may not only help (along with other
painful budget cuts) to respond to fiscal realities, but may also
produce better outcomes in terms of crime control and prevention. For example, abolitionists have taken to noting that police
chiefs are ten times more likely to cite "lack of law enforcement
resources" than "insufficient use of the death penalty" in response to the question "What interferes with effective law enforcement?" 168 In rejoinder to such utilitarian arguments, proponents of the death penalty often resort to the essentially moral or
retributivist argument that only the death penalty is an appropriate moral response to the worst crimes. 169 As a result, the rhetorical position of abolitionists and retentionists in previous debates gets flipped: abolitionists get to shed the unattractive cloak
of soft sentimentality and don the mantle of efficient crime control, while retentionists now have to rebut charges that their attachment to the death penalty is a form of unworldly moral170
ism.
in note 32).
166 See David C. Fathi, 32 Years on Death Row (Human Rights Watch 2009), online at
http/www.hrw.org/erVnews/2009/03/16/32-years-death-row (visited Aug 21, 2010). See
also Lackey v Texas, 514 US 1045, 1045 (1995) (memorandum of Justice Stevens respecting denial of certiorari) (reasoning that a death-row inmate's claim that an excessively
lengthy stay on death row constituted "cruel and unusual punishment" might merit consideration); Elledge v Florida, 525 US 944, 944 (1998) (Breyer dissenting); Johnson v
Bredesen, 130 S Ct 541, 542 (2009) (memorandum of Justice Stevens respecting denial of
certiorari); compare Soering v United Kingdom, App No 14038/88, 11 Eur HR Rep 439,
*38 (1989) (finding the prospect of a lengthy stay on death row to be a violation of human
rights).
167 See Death Penalty Information Center, The Death Penalty in 2009 (cited in note 5).
168 See Death Penalty Information Center, Facts about the Death Penalty (cited in
note 157).
169 See, for example, Louis P. Pojman, Why the Death Penalty Is Morally Permissible,
in Hugo Adam Bedau and Paul G. Cassell, eds, Debating the Death Penalty: Should
America Have CapitalPunishment? The Experts on Both Sides Make Their Best Case 51,
55-58 (Oxford 2004).
170 For example, death penalty supporters are placed in the tenuous position of arguing that no price is too high for capital punishment. In one county in Texas, after a death
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In terms of practical politics, this change in focus toward instrumental arguments has created a "bigger tent" for those concerned about capital punishment. To accommodate this broader
constituency (including politicians who have no interest in rejecting the death penalty as inhumane), advocates for withdrawal of
the death penalty have recast their efforts in terms of "repeal"
rather than "abolition." Indeed, the "repeal" movement-with its
focus on pragmatic reassessment of the costs and benefits of the
death penalty-has in many respects supplanted the narrower
and less successful "abolition" movement, which, as the term
connotes, has long been rooted in a moral imperative comparable
to the effort to end slavery. By shifting the argument from contentious moral and constitutional grounds to practical ones, the
anti-death-penalty forces provide greater political cover to public
officials (prosecutors, legislators, governors) who are skeptical
about our capital punishment system but also skeptical about
the premises of abolitionism.
This shift from humanitarian to collective arguments in the
death penalty context is of a piece with other shifts in criminal
justice policy debates. In the sentencing reform context, Rachel
Barkow has noted that state legislatures and sentencing commissions have managed to moderate criminal sentences in a way
that the federal government has not, because of the greater relative bite of the cost of corrections in state budgets. 171 Cost considerations move political actors to resist the strong political
pressures to be ever tougher on crime without directly appealing
to the interests of criminals. In Barkow's words, "consideration of
the direct cost of sentencing policies serves in some sense as a
surrogate for ... typically ignored voices [such as those of prisoners]."172 Similarly, the relatively new prisoner "reentry"
movement, which urges that greater services be provided to prison inmates so as to facilitate their reentry into their old communities upon release, 173 rejects the emphasis on paternalistic con-

sentence was set aside by the US Supreme Court, the prosecutor maintained that he
would seek a second death sentence, even though a retrial was estimated to cost as much
as $500,000, stating that "if I have to bankrupt this county, we're going to bow up and see
that justice is served." Jordan M. Steiker, Penry v. Lynaugh. The Hazards of Predicting
the Future, in Death Penalty Stories (cited in note 79), citing Steve Brewer, Penry Likely
to Face Retrial, Officials Say, Huntsville Item 3A (July 1, 1989).
171 See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 Column L Rev
1276, 1302 (2005).
172 Id at 1277, 1314.
173 See generally Jeremy Travis, Amy L. Solomon, and Michelle Waul, From Prisonto
Home: The Dimensions and Consequencesof PrisonerReentry (Urban Inst 2001).
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cern for the inmate that the rubrics of "rehabilitation" or "therapeutic jurisprudence" necessarily entail. Rather, the reentry
movement, as its name suggests, shifts the focus from the individual inmate to the community that awaits his return, and emphasizes community safety as its prime rationale, while urging
many of the same policies that proponents of rehabilitation and
therapeutic approaches endorse. The turn to cost in the capital
sentencing debate, along with appeals to cost and community
safety in the sentencing reform and prisoner reentry movements,
allows advocates for moderating the nature, length, and conditions of criminal punishment to reach across the multiplicity of
what Dan Kahan terms "cultural worldviews" that produce sharp
divides on social policy, and criminal justice issues in particular. 174 In an era in which traditionally liberal egalitarian views
on moderating criminal punishment are decidedly marginalized,
this turn to cost broadens the cultural significance or "meaning"
of opposing capital punishment and thus holds out the possibility
of "enabling persons of diverse culture orientations to converge
175
on mutually acceptable policies."
Second, in addition to shifting the general rhetorical cast of
the abolitionist position, the turn to cost has allowed abolitionists to reframe an issue that has become an increasingly sharp
thorn in their side-the issue of deterrence. In the era preceding
Furman, the claim that deterrence of murder was a plausible
justification for retaining capital punishment was generally accepted to be unproven, perhaps even unprovable. Sociologist
Thorsten Sellin, addressing the period from 1920 to 1955, found
that states that had abolished the death penalty had no higher
murder rates than those that retained it, and he confirmed this
conclusion by doing side-by-side comparisons of roughly similar,
contiguous jurisdictions. 176 Sellin's work was extensively cited by
Justice Marshall in his Furman opinion, culminating in Marshall's confident statement that "there is no correlation between
the murder rate and the presence or absence of the capital sanction."177 This view, though not without its detractors, was widely
accepted, both in the scholarly world and the world of public af-

174 Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively IlliberalState, 60 Stan L Rev 115, 149 (2007).
175 Id.

176 See Thorsten Sellin, Homicides in Retentionist and Abolitionist States, in Thorsten
Sellin, ed, Capital Punishment 135-38 (Harper & Row 1967); Thorsten Sellin, The Death
Penalty (ALI 1959).
177 Furman,408 US at 350 (Marshall concurring).
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fairs. 178 This comfortable consensus, however, was exploded by
the intervention of economist Isaac Ehrlich, who was the first
researcher to use multivariate regression analysis to study the
death penalty's deterrent effect. In 1975, Ehrlich published a
paper addressing the period from 1933 to 1969 and finding a sta179
tistically significant deterrent effect for the death penalty.
Ehrlich's paper was relied upon heavily by Solicitor General
Robert Bork in his amicus brief in Gregg and cited (though not
endorsed) by the plurality,1 8 0 while rebutted at length by Justice
Marshall in dissent.'l 8 Although Ehrlich's work was eventually
discredited by a scholarly panel of the National Academy of
Sciences in 1978,182 in the ensuing decades, many economists
and statisticians have taken up Ehrlich's torch and employed a
variety of sophisticated econometric methods to continue to test
the deterrent effect of the use of capital punishment in the postGregg era. Many of these new studies have found statistically
significant deterrent effects, but they also have been subject to
withering criticism from detractors. These critiques have challenged the incompleteness of the studies' data, the overwhelming
influence of outlier jurisdictions (like Texas), the failure to control for important variables like the introduction of new "life
without parole" provisions, and the lack of robustness of the
studies' results in response to small changes in study specifica183
tions.
Thus, in the post-Kurman, modern era of capital punishment, abolitionists have found themselves increasingly on the
defensive about the possible deterrent effect of the death penalty.
No longer able to wave away claims of deterrence by citing a
well-established consensus, abolitionists now must mount an
178 See id at 350-51 nn 108-09 (citing a variety of national and international sources
accepting Sellin's conclusion about the lack of deterrent effect of capital punishment).
179 Isaac Ehrlich, The DeterrentEffect of Capital Punishment:A Question of Life and
Death, 65 Am Econ Rev 397, 416 (1975).
180 Gregg, 428 US at 184 n 31.
181 Id at 234-35 (Marshall dissenting).
182 Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen, and Daniel Nagin, eds, Deterrence and
Incapacitation:Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates 61-62 (Natl
Acad Sci 1978).
183 For summaries of both the new generation of deterrence studies and the criticisms
the studies have engendered, see John J. Donohue and Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses
of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 Stan L Rev 791, 804-20 (2005);
Jeffrey Fagan, Death and Deterrence Redux: Science, Law and Causal Reasoning on
Capital Punishment,4 Ohio St J Crim L 255, 269-89 (2006); Robert Weisberg, The Death
Penalty Meets Social Science: Deterrence and Jury Behavior under New Scrutiny, 1 Ann
Rev L & Soc Sci 151, 153-63 (2005).
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increasingly technical defense against intuitively appealing
claims of deterrence backed up by incomprehensible (to most of
the general public) statistical studies. In addition to the lawyers,
human rights activists, law enforcement personnel, victims' family members, and members of the clergy who have always testified at legislative hearings regarding the future of capital punishment, abolitionist forces are sure to present a statistician who
will attempt to rebut in layman's terms the studies listed in
string cites by proponents of the death penalty.1 8 4 Even if successful, such rebuttals at best produce a stalemate, establishing
only that the new studies fail to satisfactorily prove a deterrent
effect, not that one does not exist.
The cost argument, however, has allowed abolitionists to escape from their defensive crouch on the deterrence issue by reframing deterrence as part of a larger and broader inquiry into
optimal crime prevention. If capital punishment were no more
expensive than life imprisonment, then it would seem natural to
focus largely on their comparative efficacy as alternative punishment options. But if abolishing capital punishment would result in cost savings above and beyond the costs of lifetime incarceration, the additional money saved could be used for other projects-whether law enforcement initiatives such as Colorado's
proposed "cold-case" funding or social programs such as funding
for early childhood education-that might offer better crime control than the foregone executions.18 5 Thus, even granting the
claim that the death penalty deters homicide better than life imprisonment, abolitionists can still argue that the cost savings
produced by abolition would yield the maximum benefits to public safety. The cost argument thus allows abolitionists to put deterrence in its (subsidiary) place in the larger calculus of crime
prevention and to differentiate being "smart on crime" from be186
ing "tough on crime."

184 See, for example, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Critical Review of the New
Evidence, Hearings on the Future of Capital Punishment in the State of New York before
the New York State Assembly Standing Committee on Codes, Assembly Standing
Committee on Judiciary, and Assembly Standing Committee on Correction (2005) (statement of Jeffrey Fagan), online at http//www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FaganTestimony.pdf
(visited Aug 21, 2010).
185 See generally John J. Donohue, III and Peter Siegelman, Allocating Resources
among Prisons and Social Programsin the Battle against Crime, 27 J Legal Stud 1 (1998)
(evaluating the cost- and crime-reducing potential of social spending in comparison to
incarceration and establishing the conditions under which a shift of resources away from
prisons and toward social programs would reduce crime).
186 See, for example, Dieter, Smart on Crime (cited in note 6).
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Third and finally, the turn to cost has allowed abolitionists
to change the frame of the equality argument about capital punishment. Whereas the equality argument in the 1960s was predominantly about race, a focus on the high cost of the death penalty highlights a new form of inequality-intrastate geographical
disparity. Once the use of capital punishment is disaggregated
on a county level rather than a state level, it becomes strikingly
obvious that the use of the death penalty is extremely "lumpy"
within states.18 7 This lumpiness no doubt has many causes that
reflect a number of differences among counties within the same
state, but one contributor to intrastate disparities is clearly the
high cost of pursuing capital sentences. Unlike the costs of imprisonment, which are borne largely at the state level, the costs
of capital punishment fall predominantly at the local level, on
the individual counties that prosecute capital crimes through
their locally elected district attorneys.' 8 8 The phenomenon of intrastate disparity has caught the attention of both state legislatures studying their own capital justice systems and the ABA in
reviewing state death penalty systems as part of its Moratorium
Implementation Project. 189 By highlighting geographic disparity,
the cost argument broadens the equality concern from the narrow and potentially divisive issue of race toward a more broadly
inclusive conception of the problem. Even states that are reluctant to acknowledge a "race problem" must acknowledge that
they have multiple counties (and thus likely have some form of
geographic disparity as well). Moreover, whereas the Supreme
Court could reject challenges to racial disparities in the imposition of capital punishment because such challenges would inevitably and unacceptably call into question all criminal punishment,1 90 geographic disparities are unique to capital punishment
because of the way in which the costs of administering the death
187 See Carol S. Steiker, 81 Or L Rev at 106 (cited in note 159) (describing extreme
geographical disparities within Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Texas).
188 See Katherine Baicker, The Budgetary Repercussions of Capital Convictions, 4
Advances in Econ Anal & Pol 1, '10 (Berkeley Electronic 2004), online at httpi/www.
bepress.con/bejeap/advances/vol4fissl/artW (visited Aug 21, 2010).
189 See Andrew Ditchfield, Note, Challenging the Intrastate Disparities in the
Application of Capital Punishment Statutes, 95 Georgetown L J 801, 807, 827-28 (2007)
(describing a variety of state-level studies on intrastate disparity); ABA Death Penalty
Moratorium Implementation Project, Why a Moratorium? (ABA), online at httpV/www.
abanet.orghnoratoriun/why.html (visited Aug 21, 2010) (noting that "geographic disparities remain rampant').
190 See McCleskey v Kemp, 481 US 279, 314-15 (1987) ("McCleskey's claim, taken to
its logical conclusion, throws into serious question the principles that underlie our entire
criminal justice system.").
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penalty remain highly localized; it is unlikely that the application of other criminal sanctions are nearly as "lumpy" as the
death penalty is. Thus, the cost argument has helped to reinvigorate equality concerns about the administration of capital punishment in an era in which such arguments have otherwise had
limited purchase.
How might the issue of cost alter the future course of the
American death penalty? As noted above, cost concerns have already contributed to the steep decline in capital sentencing, perhaps the most noteworthy development in the modern era. The
average number of death sentences nationwide over the past four
years (about 114) is significantly below the nationwide average of
a decade ago (close to 300) and at the lowest level since reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976.191 The extent of the decline in capital sentencing is reflected in the fact that no year
between 1982 and 1999 produced fewer than 250 death sentences nationwide whereas none of the past six years has produced
even 150.192 Indeed, the current number of annual death sentences is about the same as the number produced annually in the
early 1960s, when the number of murders nationwide was lower
by about 40 percent (about 9,000 per year compared to the current 16,500 per year 193).
One might imagine that this sort of decline in death sentencing-if sustained-would marginalize capital punishment as
a significant aspect of American criminal justice and that the
death penalty might simply disappear from public view. But unlike in the 1960s, even radical declines in capital sentencing
would not significantly reduce the size of American death rows.
The national death-row population in the early 1960s hovered
around 260; the current national death row hovers closer to
3,300.194 Absent a dramatic increase in executions (which would
be contrary to the current downward trend), future declines in
capital sentencing might well exacerbate the already striking
disconnect between the extent of American death sentencing and
death-row incarceration, especially in states without significant
191 Death Penalty Information Center, Facts about the Death Penalty (cited in note
157).
192 Id.
193 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Reported Crime in United States-Total (DOJ 2009),
online at http/bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/dataonline/Searcb/Crime/State/RunCrimeStateby
State.cfm (visited Aug 21, 2010).
194 Death Penalty Information Center, Size of Death Row by Year, online at
http;//www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year#year
(visited Aug 21, 2010).
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executions. As this disconnect grows, we might expect to see
growing disenchantment with the death penalty on economic
grounds, as states are forced to internalize the costs of largescale death-row incarceration of an aging inmate population, and
yet see little sign of the death penalty's presence in other respects. Such a discord would visibly implicate a generational divide in which the state was saddled with the costs of a policy
that found few expressions of contemporary support (in terms of
prosecutorial decisions to seek, and juror decisions to return,
sentences of death). In this respect, the cost argument has a selfpropelling power, by influencing present-day decisions to seek
death (which reduces the role of capital punishment going forward) and by highlighting the burdens imposed via previous robust imposition of death sentences.
Apart from discouraging capital prosecutions, concerns
about cost might tip the balance in some states toward repeal.
Such concerns appear to have played a role in the developments
in New Jersey, New York, and New Mexico, and cost remains a
prominent consideration in the ongoing abolition debates in several other states (including Kansas, Maryland, Montana, and
New Hampshire). The power of the cost argument in these and
other states is not simply its ability to focus decisionmakers on
competing public goods. The concern about costs also indirectly
sheds light on numerous pathologies in prevailing capital practice, including the inability of states to satisfy minimum constitutional requirements in capital trials (reflected in high reversal
rates), the absence of political will to carry out executions, the
arbitrariness wrought by the few executions that are in fact implemented, and the difficulties (both pragmatic and moral)
stemming from prolonged death-row incarceration. Cost is not
only a way of avoiding anti-death penalty arguments that have
less traction (such as concerns about arbitrariness or human
dignity); focusing on cost reminds the audience of these problems
even as it concentrates attention on the bottom line. And, as
noted above, framing the death penalty in terms of cost invites
the support of political actors who are uncomfortable with the
goal of "abolition" where their opposition is rooted less in moral
absolutism than in pragmatic reassessment. The marginalization
of the death penalty for practical reasons might in fact lead to
the absolute and permanent withdrawal of the death penalty in
certain jurisdictions, with the possibility that "abolition" of the
death penalty might be achieved in large part because of the
political support of non-abolitionists.
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The repeal of the death penalty in a few more marginal
death penalty states (with small death rows and few executions)
might yield disproportionate results both politically and constitutionally. On the political side, there may well be a tipping
point at which repeal accelerates, especially given the significant
number of nominally "death penalty" states in which the practice
is essentially moribund. Almost half (sixteen) of the retentionist
states (thirty-five) have conducted six or fewer executions in the
modern era; 195 each of these states shares a border with at least
one similarly inactive death penalty state or a state without the
death penalty altogether.196
On the constitutional side, even small movements in state
legislative activity have the potential to enhance the prospects
for judicial abolition. The Court's recent decisions invalidating
the death penalty for persons with mental retardation and juveniles found those practices inconsistent with national norms despite the fact that they were prohibited in only a minority of
death penalty states.1 97 In the case involving persons with mental retardation, the Court emphasized the "consistency of the
direction of change" toward prohibition.1 9 8 If a small but significant group of states were to join the jurisdictions that have recently abolished the death penalty, and no states were to reinstate it (there appears to be little momentum in this direction),
the Court might view the development as important evidence of
prevailing American values; together with continued declines in
death sentencing and executions (even in jurisdictions with previously robust use of the death penalty), a wave of abolitionist
activity could lead the Court to conclude that the death penalty
was no longer sufficiently embraced as a practice to justify its
continued imposition (notwithstanding the presence of numerous
capital statutes on the books). Indeed, even without new states
joining the abolitionist camp, a steady and consistent decline in
death sentences-motivated in large part by cost considera195 Death Penalty Information Center, State by State Database(cited in note 8) (states
that have conducted six or fewer executions in the modern era: Colorado, Connecticut,
Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming).
196 Jim Nelson, Bill Would Repeal South Dakota's Death Penalty, Feb 18, 2010, KSFY
Television (on file with authors) (stating "South Dakota is the only state in our area that
still has the death penalty.").
197 Atkins v Virginia, 536 US 304, 321 (2002) (concluding death is not a "suitable
punishment for a mentally retarded criminal"); Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551, 578 (2005)
(holding the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid sentencing offenders who were
under the age of eighteen when their crimes were committed to death).
198 Atkins, 536 US at 315.
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tions-might lead the Court to invalidate the death penalty. In
Furman itself, Justice White indicated that in-frequent recourse
to the death penalty undercut its ability to serve either of its advertised purposes (deterrence or retribution); 199 in Justice
White's view, a central problem with the pre-Furmanworld was
the rarity of death sentences and executions, which transformed
the death penalty into "the pointless and needless extinction of
life with only marginal contributions to any discernable social or
public purposes." 20 0 Justice White's point dropped from view in
light of the explosive state reaction to Furman and the precipitous rise in death sentencing and executions between 1972 and
2000. But if cost and other considerations cause states to remain
below their pre-Furman death sentencing rates (with only one
out of every 150 or so murders producing a death sentence),
Justice White's position might again become constitutionally salient. Indeed, Justice Stevens's recent declaration that he regarded the death penalty as no longer consistent with the
Constitution (despite his key role in upholding the punishment
in the 1976 decisions) relied heavily on Justice White's insistence
that "a penalty with such negligible returns to the State is patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of
the Eighth Amendment."2° 1 Thus, to the extent the cost calculation leads to increasingly rare death penalty trials and sentences, the cost calculation becomes a constitutional one.
CONCLUSION

American capital practice has changed markedly over the past
four decades. Constitutional regulation of state death penalty
practices has transformed the size and scope of capital trials;
federal and state court review of capital verdicts has become
more intricate and time-consuming; and state death rows remain
quite large despite significant declines in capital sentencing.
These changes have altered the cost of capital punishment and,
perhaps more importantly, public perceptions about the cost of
capital punishment. Government officials, death penalty opponents and supporters, and the broader public have slowly but
now almost unanimously concluded that the costs of capital punishment outweigh the costs of lifetime noncapital incarceration.
With this change in perception, the contemporary debate over
199 Furman,408 US at 310-14 (White concurring).
200 Id at 312.
201 Baze v Rees, 553 US at 91-92 (Stevens concurring).
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capital punishment is strikingly different from its previous iterations. The new realities of capital litigation, combined with the
rising costs of corrections and the recent financial crisis, ensured
that the cost argument would be born. But its vigorous health
and staying power reflect the ways in which advocacy on difficult
moral issues--even ones that have literally always been with
us-is often recast to fit the current moment's needs and priorities. The rise of the new cost argument and the rhetorical and
strategic uses to which it has been put demonstrates that it is
simply not the case that each generation inherits a dusty, offthe-rack set of arguments about capital punishment from the
past. Rather, each era gets its own distinctive debate, cut from
the particular cloth of the time.

